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INTRODUCTION: LIDERALISM, FREEDOMS, AND NATIONAL MINORITIES
There is a resurgence of discussion regarding the rights of ethnic and national
minorities in liberal democracies. This is hardly a new feature within liberalism, whose
theorists have traditionally vacillated concerning the challenges presented by the presence
of national minorities in nation states. Yet from WWII until the early 1990's, little could
be found in the literature of social theory that attempted a sustained and in-depth analysis
of what is now one of the most hotly contested issues within the liberal tradition. l Since
that time however, there has been an explosion of writing on the subject as growing
difficulties within liberal democracies concerning their approaches to multiculturalism,
national millorities, and the demands of polyethnicities have forced liberal theorists to
reconsider their approach by considering extending group rights to various types of
minorities.
This work examines the relationship between liberal theory and the group rights
claims of national minorities in the United States, with special emphasis on Native
Americans, and then proposes that group rights can in fact be seen as a logical extension
of liberal pri11ciples when applied to national minorities. I will argue that liberal theories
that focus solely upon ind.ividual rights cannot adequately promote the goal of freedom
that is liberalism's paramount concern, and that, counter-intuitively, group rights are in
fact necessary to promote the equal distribution of individual freedoms within a liberal
government. I will demonstrate this by arguing that any liberal nation will, by its nature,
1 For a more in depth discussion of the history of the liberal tradition, see Kymlicka, 1989a:CHIO; 1991
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tend to systematically advantage some groups within its borders while simultaneously
disadvantaging other groups. This condition, if left uncorrected, represents a severe
violation ofboth the principle of neutrality and the principle of rational revisability,
which are both core concerns within liberal theory. This leads me to argue that the best
way to correct this bias is through the extension of group rights to national minorities in
order to mitigate the unequal distribution of burdens that are perpetuated by government
and other social structures.
CHARACTERISTICS OF LIBERALISM
Michael Sandel provides one of the better-stated general descriptions of
liberalism, when he defines liberalism as a theory that "gives pride of place to justice,
fairness, and individual rights. Its core thesis is this: a just society seeks not to promote
any particular ends, but enables its citizens to pursue their own ends, consistent with a
similar liberty for all ... " (Sandel, 1984: p.13)
Sandel notes in Democracies Discontent that liberalism can take many forms and
at times these forms can seem to he polar opposites. Arrayed on the right wing of
liberalism are such theorists as Robert Nozick, David Gauthier, and John Stuart Mill, who
affirm the inviolability of property rights, and who oppose most forms of state
redistribution of resources except for extremely limited purposes. Championing the left-
wing of liberalism are theorists such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce
Ackerman, who affirm the necessity of rectifying undeserved inequalities, seeking to
redistribute social resources to secure the well being of the least advantaged.
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TRADITIONAL LIBERAL PRINCIPLES
Depending upon which pole of liberalism one tends to focus upon, its
characteristics can vary greatly; yet at least two central claims seem to pervade all stripes
of liberalism. The first, rational revisability, makes the claim that individuals have the
capacity to revise their own ends and do not possess fixed, unalterable conceptions of
what is to be considered morally good. Instead, the individual is seen as being able to
change those moral allegiances and their concomitant ends if they are no longer thought
to be sound principles by which to live one's life. The state promotes rational revisability
by ensuring that individuals and groups who seek to limit autonomy in this sense are
unable to invoke the coercive power of the state in order to do so. Further, the state
provides educational opportunities that allow, and may even encourage, one to cultivate
the capacity to rationally revise one's conception of the good. (Debating Democracy's
Discontent 1995, p. 133)
The second idea that most forms of liberalism share is that the state should remain
neutral among competing conceptions of the good. This is manifested through the refusal
of the state to authorize legislation that appeals to a particular conception of the good as
being intrinsically superior to other conceptions as the reason for it's adoptation. The
state is to protect the capacity of the individual to judge which conception(s) of the good
has more value, and to create a fair distribution of socials goods and resources
commensurate with empowering individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good.
The state further defines property rights and transferal practices, and insists that all of its
citizens respect the rightful claims of others, even if it requires them to adjust their own
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conceptions of the good. (p. 133) An astute observer may note that the idea of the state
remaining neutral among conceptions of the good seems to contradict the idea that the
state may require individuals to adjust their own conceptions of the good in some cases.
This challenge is typically answered through the development of the 'harm principle'.
Mill defines the harm principle in the following fashion,
"That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons
for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from
which it is desired to deter hinl must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the
conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely COnCelTIS himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign." (Mill 1975, p. 10-11)
So, according to Mill, the only conditions under which society may interfere with
an individual's actions are in those cases where said actions will harm others or where the
individual's exercising of a11 action will prevent a similar exercise by another person.
Yet there remains a third characteristic of liberalism that is peculiar to the more left-wing
liberal theories and which can have a significant impact upon how liberal theory
ultimately plays out; specifically, the rectification of morally arbitrary inequalities.
Morally arbitrary inequalities refer to those inequalities which were neither chosen nor
deserved and which "A liberal theory ofjustice will insist that individuals can come to
have different holdings as a result of different choices that they have made about how
they wish to lead their lives ...However, ifpeople have unequal holdings as a result of
their circumstances-rather than their own choices-then these are morally arbitrary and
unjust. Sources of morally arbitrary inequalities include not only social
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circumstances ...but also natural endowments ..." (p.134) It is this left-wing tradition
within liberalism that I believe will offer the solution to the apparent tension between
offering group rights while remaining within a liberal context. I will further argue that
offering group rights to national minorities will allow liberalism to finally make good
upon it promises of freedom and equality.
DEFINITION OF 'NATIONAL MINORITY'
Although the lise of the term 'national minority' is now quite common in the
literature, I will follow Will Kymlicka's formulation. Kymlicka explains his use of the
term by first defining a nation in the following fashion, "[A] .. 'nation' means a historical
community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or
homeland, sharing a distinct language alld culture ...A country which contains more than
one nation is, therefore, not a nation-state but a multinational state, and the smaller
culture forms a national minority". (Kymlicka 1995, p.ll) Examples of national
minorities within the United States include American Indians, Hawaiian Island natives,
Puerto Ricans, and various Pacific Island natives. This list is not to be considered
exhaustive of the national minorities within tIle United States, but should help to illustrate
when combined with the above definition what is meant by the term 'national minority' .
This can be contrasted with ethnic minorities, who typically choose to immigrate with the
expectation of integrating into the new natioll, with the eventual hope of becoming full
citizens. While ethnic minorities sometimes seek greater recognition and
accommodation of some of their ethnic customs, they rarely have the expectation or the
aim of becoming a self-governing state within the larger nation; instead they typically
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choose to enter into their new nation in a way that more or less fully integrates them with
other citizens. While other types of minority groups do exist within the United States, it
will not be the purpose of this paper to directly address their potential claims to various
types of group rights.
DEFINING GROUPS
One of the classic difficulties in proposals involving group rights resides in the
indeterminacy of group membership. Given that group membership seems to be
somewhat fluid, how can one as a matter of policy offer protections to a group without
either benefiting those who shouldn't or failing to benefit those who should gain such
protections? In the case of some national minorities, this case is made somewhat easier
by the presence of genetic evidence tIlat can serve as a biological basis for group
membership. However, this criteria doesn't apply to all national minorities and therefore
may only be beneficial in those cases where such a luxury is available or desirable. For
the purpose of showing why some groups should be granted group rights,we shall need
to pursue those characteristics of group membership that are relevant to the justification
of the group rights. While other types of rights or group conditions may exist, I will
remain focused upon those characteristics that apply to group membership within
national minorities. In National Self-Determination, Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz
provide the following criteria for group membership, which I believe should offer some
assistance in defining a group. (Margalit 1990)
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First, a group needs to have 'a common character and a common culture that
encompasses many, varied and important aspects of life, a culture that defines or marks a
variety of forms or styles of life, types of activities, occupations, pursuits, and
relationships'. (p. 443) In the case of national minorities we might expect to find national
cuisines, a common language, distinctive literary and artistic accomplishments,
construction of a form of government, shared customs, distinctive styles of dress, etc.
While none of these is necessary, they do serve as examples of the features that
characterize peoples into groups. Their cultures are, or were, institutionally complete and
offer cultural traditions that penetrate beyond a few areas of human life, 'and display
themselves in a whole range of areas, including many which are of great importance for
the well-being of individuals. (p. 443-444)
Second, and correlative to the first feature, is that people growing up in sucll a
culture will be marked by its character. Their tastes and options will be affected by that
culture, possibly including the types of careers open to one, 'the leisure activities one
learned to appreciate and is therefore able to choose from, the customs and habits that
define and color relations' with others, and the 'patterns of expectations and attitudes
between spouses and among other members of the family, features of lifestyles with
which one is capable of empathizing and for which one may therefore develop a taste'.
All of these features will be affected by membership within the group but not indelibly
so. Individuals may choose to migrate to other cultural environs, but this process is
typically slow and painful, and often marked by imperfect achievement. "The point made
is merely the modest one that, given the pervasive nature of the culture of the groups we
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are seeking to identify, their influence on individuals who grow up in their midst is
profound and far-reaching." (Margalit 1990, p. 444) This point needs to be established in
order to connect concern with the prosperity of the group with concern for the well-being-
of individuals.
Third, typically membership within the group is a matter of mutual recognition
rather than of achievement. Among other conditions, one is recognized by other members
of the group as belonging to it. Other conditions may be accidents of birth or the sharing
of group culture, etc. Membership within these groups is often a matter of informal
acknowledgement of belonging, rather than through any official procedure. (p. 445)
Fourth, membership within the group is important for one's self-identification.
Membership within the group carries with it a 'high social profile' that results in not only
in the perception of a group as such, but also serves as 'one of the primary facts by which
people are identified, and which fonn expectations as to what they are like'. Not only
does membership withill the group affect the views of those outside of the group, but it
also serves as an important identifying feature for each group member about
himself/herself. (p. 446)
Fifth, 'membership is a matter of belonging, not of achievement'; one does not
have to prove oneself, excel at something, etc, in order to be considered a member of the
group. 'To the extent that membership normally involves recognition by others as a
member, that recognition is not conditional on meeting qualifications that indicate any
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accomplishment'. Membership is often non-voluntary, in as much as one belongs because
of who one is. One can come to belong to such a group by adopting their customs, tastes,
habits, etc., but this change would presumably be a very slow process. The fact that
membership within the group is determined by belonging and not accomplishment makes
these groups more secure, and thereby allows for secure identification with the group,
which makes groups suitable for their role as a primary foci of identification. (p. 446-
447)
Finally, groups are not small gatherings of people whose members are generally
known to all other members. They are large, anonymous groups 'where mutual
recognition is secured by the possession of general characteristics.' This qualification is
not arbitrary since small groups that are based on such familiarity, such as families, are
markedly different in their relationships and interactions than are larger anonymous
groups. Larger, anonymous groups 'tend to develop conventional means of identification'
that often include 'the use of symbolic objects, participation in group ceremonies, special
group manners, or special vocabulary', which serve to aid in identification of group
members. These characteristics affect the way that others treat members as well as the
ways in which members will react to others. (p. 447)
These six criteria combined with the early list of characteristics of national





Liberalism in all of its manifestations has attempted to promote individual
freedoms and the autonomy of the individual. Given its emphasis on the rights of the
individual, it is often argued that liberalism has no place for group rights within it. After
all, if the rights of each individual were assured, then it might be contended that no
groups would require special rights as their interests would already be represented and
protected through each of their individual claims. Yet is this actually the case? In order
to see that it is not, a look into the character of rights seems to be in order.
JOSEPH RAZ'S CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS
Joseph Raz offers the following general definition of how people come to possess
rights, whic11 will serve as a starting point. "'X has a right' if and only if X can have
rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect ofX's well-being (his interest) is a
sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty." (1986. P166)
Raz's claim is not that any interest is capable of generating a right, but rather that my
interest yields a right only if it is an interest that is serious enough to create a duty for
others. As Peter Jones explains " .. for Raz, rights and duties do not stand in a merely
correlative relation; rather, normatively, the logic runs from rights to duties in that it is an
aspect of my well being that provides the reason for another's having a duty. In that way,
rights ground duties." (1999. p357)
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Raz is also willing to extend moral rights to groups or collectives if they meet the
following conditions, "First, it exists because an aspect of the interest of human beings
justifies holding some person(s) to be subject to a duty. Secolld, the interests in question
are the interests of individuals as members of a group in a public good and the right is a
right to that public good because it serves their interest as members of the group.
Thirdly, the interest of no single member of that group in that public good is sufficient by
itself to justify holding another person to be subject to a duty." (1986, p.208) On this
model of rights, a national minority may generate a group right on the basis of sharing an
interest in the maintenance of the culture through which they developed a way of life and
secured their identity. While the interest of anyone of these individuals may not be
sufficient on this model to secure a right, the communal interest of the whole group may
suffice to generate a right.
Raz's conception of group rights, it may be noted, allows for nearly any group to
be able to generate rights and thereby duties upon others, as long as the group shares an
interest of sufficient moment to spawn a rights claim. This characteristic allows for the
possibility that nearly any group could claim a group right if their interest was
sufficiently linked to some aspect of their well-being that was sufficiently important to
merit protection. In order to better explain what ought to be considered for protection
under the aegis of group rights, and which rights should continue to be defended in terms
of individual rights, I appeal to the following clarification.
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DENISE REAUME'S CLARIFICATION
Denise Reaume offers a vision of what such a conception might be characterized
as in Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods where she argues that clean air, for
example, is a good public to a community of breathers, but it is consumed by each
privately rather than publicly: each inhales and enjoys the benefits of clean air as an
individual. 1I1deed, the case of clean air seems to indicate that some public goods might
reasonably be the objects of individual rights, that is, each individual's claim is
sufficiently weighty to entail a duty upon others not to contaminate the breathing
environment. On this model, someone who pollutes the air violates the right of each
affected individual, rather than a group right possessed by the entire body of air
consumers. It follows then that even though a group can have a right to a public good,
not all rights to public goods need to be group rights.
By adopting a conception of group rights that serves to limit the possible objects
of group rights, it narrows the scope of what can be considered a group right as such,
while still maintaining a robust conception of individual rights. But even with such a
limiting of what can rightly be considered a group right, a significant array of objects still
remain that could be considered bearers of group rights. Take for example those public
goods that are 'public' in a special sellse such as 'participatory goods'. A 'participatory
good', is a type of public good that, due to its nature, must be enjoyed publicly if it is to
be enjoyed at all. As Reaume explains, "They involve activities that not only require
many in order to produce the good but are valuable only because of the joint involvement
of many. The publicity of production itself is part of what is valued-the good is the
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participation.,,2 Examples of this sort of good include friendship, team games, living in a
cultured society, sharing a common language, and being a member of a religious
community among others. It is this sort of right that the liberal governments of the world
have had difficulty fairly promoting in multinational states by remaining largely focused
on the promotion of individual rights. 3
In individual-centered liberal theory, participatory goods such as those mentioned
above are to receive no special protections, since this would seem to be privileging a
particular conception of the good and therefore violating the principles of equality and
ethno-cultural neutrality. However, I will argue in the following sections that such a
'privileging' in fact better serves the liberal demands of ethno-cultural neutrality and
equality; since under any liberal government certain inequalities will inevitably result
from the state's structural configuration that will unfairly restrain certain groups within
those societies while serving to prOlTIote the lifestyles of other members of the state.
Specifically, I will argue that the nation building agendas of liberal governments have
often served as a destructive force upon national minorities, and that liberal theory needs
to be reexamined in light of the historical realities of the national minorities within the
state.
2 Reaume, 'Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods', p 10
3 or more accurately, by remaining focused on the individual rights of the dominant majority. See chapter
IV for more on this argument.
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CHAPTER THREE
IMPACT OF LIBERALISM UPON NATIONAL MINORITIES
While one can certainly argue that liberal theory has never been perfectly
implemented by those nations that profess liberal ideals, one cannot say that it has been
completely ignored. These embodiments, in the form of liberal governments, can provide
valuable insights as test cases for liberalism and perhaps serve as indicators of more
fundamental theoretical difficulties. Additionally the contextual realities of the relative
status of national minorities, combined with a historical account of how they arrived in
their present condition can provide crucial information in both how liberal governments
can now deal with the problems presented by national minorities and what solutions
might best be employed to meet the requirements of social justice.
I will argue that the impact of liberal governments upon national minorities has at
best produced ambiguous results, and at worst has been an unmitigated disaster. Further,
I will claim that a particular conception of liberalism can be identified as having
contributed to many of the difficulties that liberalism has had in the accommodation of
national minorities.
MILL'S CONCEPTION OF NATION STATES
Following John Stewart Mill, individual-centered liberals have argued that
democracies must be a government 'by the people'. But which people was Mill actually
referring to? In the cases of states that possessed multiple nationalities, Mill might better
be read as advocating a government 'by a people', for the following reason. For Mill, the
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ties between nationality and effective democracy were very close indeed, for he believed
that a rule 'by the people' was only possible if those peoples within the democracy truly
did see themselves as a single people who shared a common nationality. For established
nations, this meant that any national minorities should be assimilated as rapidly as
possible into the dominant majority, since a common nationality was thought to be a
necessary condition in the formation of effective democracies. Indeed, Mill was skeptical
that multinational states could form free institutions as evinced by the following "Among
a people without fellow-feelings, especially if they read and speak different languages,
the united public necessary to the workings of representative institutions cannot
exist ... [It] is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of
governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities." (Mill
1972;230,233; cf. Kymlicka 1995)
Ironically, this could actually be used to pose an argument for granting national
minorities independent state status, but Mill never considered such an approach since he
saw it as a duty of liberal governments to take a paternal view towards the 'backward'
nations of the earth and attempt to bring them into the fold of the 'civilized' world of
modem states. In the United States, which will be the primary focus of this paper, a
variety of measures intended to bring about the formation of a new liberal nation-state
were used at various times, many of which worked to the clear detriment of those who
can now be considered as national minorities. Of course, not all of the actions
perpetrated by what would become the United States of America can be laid at the door
of liberalism, as clearly some of the policies were the result of imperialism and other
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familiar evils; nevertheless, many of the United States policies can be traced back to a
right-wing strand of liberal thought.
HISTORICAL IMPACT OF LIBERALISM UPON THE UNITED STATES
By the 19th century liberal thought had become thoroughly entrenched in the
political culture of the United States. The United States, following in the footsteps of
many of the so-called 'great nations' of Europe (France, Spain, England, Italy, Germany,
Russia, etc.) sought to foster a sense of common identity through the assimilation of the
various national minorities within its state boundaries, many of which still reside within
the United States today. These national minorities include Native Americans, Puerto
Ricans, and several other groups who had established nations prior to the creation of the
United States.
In fact, it can be argued that many of these nations have better claims to much of
what is now the United States. Following the American Revolution, the United States
was widely viewed as an outlaw nation, lacking legitimacy in its territorial claims and
generally shunned by the international community. In a strange twist of fate, it was the
Continental Congress that was desperate to enter into treaties with the indigenous tribes,
since those tribes had already been recognized as legitimate sovereign nations through
their treaties with European nations and could thereby confer a semblance of legitimacy
upon the nation. (Churchill, 2000. p.404) Additionally,
"The urgency of the matter was compounded by the fact that the Indians maintained military parity with,
and in some cases superiority to, the U.S. Army all along the frontier. As a result, both Articles of
Confederation and the subsequent Constitution of the United States contained clauses explicitly and
exclusively restricting relations with indigenous nations to the federal government, insofar as the former
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were recognized as enjoying the same politico-legal status as any other foreign power." (Churchill, 2000.
p.404)
Even as late as the 1803 Louisiana purchase the United States was seen to
recognize the sovereign rights of indigenous peoples when "the federal government
solemnly pledged itself to protect "the inhabitants of the ceded territory... in the free
enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion they profess." Other phraseology in
the purchase agreelnent makes it clear that federal authorities understood they were
acquiring from the French, not the land itself, but Frances monopolistic trade rights and
prerogatives to buy any acreage within the area its indigenous owners wanted to sell."
(Churchill, 2000. p.405)
However, as the United States grew secure in its power it soon forgot its earlier
recognition of the sovereignty of national minorities. These groups were subdued and
brought into the nation through a variety of means ranging from treaties to out and out
military destruction. After this point, many of the Native American Nations were granted
domestic dependent status, which ostensibly granted them a wide variety of freedoms
including the ability to maintain their own courts, governments, and the ability to enter
into treaty negotiations, but were viewed as states somewhat inferior or subject to the
United States. Many of these rights, limited as they were, were later revoked or bypassed
as the United States solidified its ll0ld through intensive nation building strategies. But it
can be argued that tIle United States clearly granted them special considerations due to
their nation status, based on a variety of factors, including their cultural distinctness, and
recognized their sovereignty at the time they entered into the polity.
17
EFFECTS OF NATION BUILDING UPON NATIONAL MINORITIES
Nation building strategies, as alluded to above, playa key role in understanding
why group rights should be offered to some national minorities. In order to foster a fonn
of unity that some in the liberal tradition find invaluable, the United States began exerting
an increasing amount of pressure on its national minorities to assimilate into the
dominant anglophile culture. For the purposes of this paper I will focus on three different
policies designed to foster a sense of common nationality: 1) language policies, 2) state
formation practices, and 3) public education. I will contend that these policies are not
ethno-culturally neutral and are unlikely to ever be due to the nature of nation building
practices, but instead favor particular dominant nations within the states. I will also argue
that liberal theory has largely ignored several interests that are potentially beneficial to
the human condition, such as recognition, cultural membership, identity, and language
rights. These interests further seem to be significant enough to require protection in the
form of group rights, as when neglected they can cause significant harms, even when
individual civil, political, and welfare rights are being respected, by causing serious
damage to peoples sense of self-respect and agency. When these interests are
significantly impeded, it can result in a limiting of autonomy that precludes the ability of
a person to make uncoerced decisions regarding which conceptions of the good he or she
wishes to pursue.
LANGUAGE POLICIES
Liberal theory has often operated under the assumption that the state, in the course
of its operation, should abide by a principle of neutrality. By neutrality, I refer to the idea
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that the state is to remain neutral with respect to its citizen's conception of the good, and
should not interfere unless that the actions that issue from that conception are harmf\II to
or infringe on the rights of others. Citizens should be allowed to pursue their own ends,
without interference, in so much as such pursuits do not harm others. Kymlicka notes
that Michael Walzer aptly applies this principle to ethnic groups and nationality"...by
arguing that liberalism involves a 'sharp divorce of state and ethnicity'. The liberal state
stands above all the various ethnic and national groups in the country, 'refusing to
endorse or support their ways of life or to take an active interest in their social
reproduction'. Instead, the state is 'neutral with reference to language, history, literature,
calendar' of these groups." (Kymlicka, 2001, p.23) But is this idea actually possible to
implement in the context of the contemporary liberal state? I claim that it is not.
This principle of neutrality, a centerpiece of liberal theory, has in fact masked a
prejudiced bias in faTvor of dominant majorities. When a liberal state implements and
carries through its nation building policies, certain biases emerge as a result of these
practices. Charles Taylor notes that "If a modem society has an 'official' language, in
the fullest sense of the term, that is, a state-sponsored, -inculcated, and -defined language
and culture in which both economy and state function, then it is obviously an immense
advantage to people if this language and culture are theirs. Speakers of other languages
are at a distinct disadvantage." (Taylor, 1997, p.34)
In the United States, the English language clearly meets these criteria, as it is the
language of the schools, public offices, and commerce in nearly every instance. In other
19
words, Anglophiles enjoy an immense advantage in the public sphere, beginning with the
fact that they, and largely only they, have access to it at all. Given this fact, it seems
strange that modem liberals are so chary of group rights that could protect those groups
that are inadvertently disadvantaged by nation building policies. lfthe dominant majority
within the multinational country refuses to allow for institutions that accommodate the
languages of national minorities, this severely limits the spheres in which the minority
language can operate. Further this provides a clear example of a violation of the principle
of neutrality, as the dominant majority clearly has not remained neutral with reference to
language through its policy of effectively advocating a state language, which provides a
tacit endorsement of the majority cultures language while penalizing the minority
cultures language by limiting the sphere in which it can effectively operate.
Kymlicka notes that such limitations can present a grim set of options for national
minorities. They can either assimilate into the dominant culture and face the eventual
loss of their mother tongue, which is a crucial element for retention of a sense of national
identity4, try to gain some sort of semi-autonomous state powers that allow them to use
their language in their day to day interactions, or they can accept permanent
marginalization within the dominant culture and the corresponding disadvantages to their
economic, political, and social lives. (2001, p.27-8) It has been widely recognized in
liberal thought that language is a powerful tool in nation building as it tends to foster a
4 For it is highly unlikely that without the support of a viable societal culture to sustain it that any language
will remain an active one, especially if one is denied the opportunity to use it in those activities within day
to day life that are crucial to the languages progenation. One has only to look at many of the ethnic
minorities who have immigrated into the United States, few of which have maintained their traditional
languages past their 3rd generation of occupancy.
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sense of solidarity as well as facilitate communication, and national language policies-
whether formal or informal-have been the rule rather than the exception in individual-
centered liberal governments. Yet the effects of the denial of language rights on national
minorities are scarcely considered. It was assumed that nation states gain the moral
authority to subsume those national minorities who reside within their borders.
By seeking to assimilate nations into a single nation, the aggressor fails to
recognize the fact that people value their natiol1al identity as representing their peoples'
response to the challenges presented to them. Further, the difficulties involved in
attempting to assimilate into a foreign culture, even when such an attempt is voluntary,
can be considerable. The strong links between language and/or culture to personal
identity can make assimilation into new cultures difficult. Both of these factors play some
role in the establishing of personal characteristics and are therefore relatively deeply
ingrained and difficult to change. Reaume, commenting on this notes,
"The difficulties of transfer can indeed be diverse and substantial. To begin with, there is the personal
effort involved in learning the new way of life. This is often a lengthy process and frequently one marked
by imperfect achievement. The complexity and subtlety of such comprehensive social practices as language
are notorious. The difficulty in mastering them means that in so far as one needs to use new cultural forms
to achieve independent objective-using a new language to get a job, or using a new conception of
relationships with coworkers to gain acceptance on the job, for example-these independent objectives
may be impaired." (Reaume 2000, p. 247-48)
When this assimilation is forcible or unfairly negotiated, the pressures placed
upon the assimilating culture's members can be intense and dehabilitating. Still, the
argument that cultural assimilation can be difficult, \V-hile providing some support for the
value of language, doesn't seen to demonstrate why a particular language has intrinsic
value. A right-wing liberal theorist such as Mill could acknowledge that languages are
difficult to learn and that there may indeed be some disadvantages to not speaking the
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national language. They might then argue that what needs to be done is to reduce the
negative effects and to speed the transition to the new language. Policies could be crafted
that would support the members of the minority until such time as they could learn the
new language. Additionally, their children could be educated in the new language and
could reasonably be expected to be fully fluent, so within a few generations one could
expect the linguistic group to make a relatively smooth transition to the new language.
In order to understand why a particular language should be protected and viewed
as a right, one must move away from such an instrumental view of language. Denise
Reaume argues in Official Language Rights, that the only way of protecting particular
languages is to view it as having intrinsic value. This can be achieved by viewing each
particular language as 'a human accomplishment' that is, in itself, 'a manifestation of
human creativity which has value independent of its uses'. While other languages may
offer approximate equivalences, each language 'is a unique form of expression and
valuable as such'. Each language can be seen as a 'cultural inheritance and as a marker of
identity as a participant in the way of life it represents'. The particular form that a
language takes gains its value for them because it is their language, their creation. For the
group as a whole, the language stands as a creative accomplishment. For the individual,
to speak in the language 'is at once a participation in this accomplishment and an
expression of belonging to the community'. Reaume explains that it is only when two or
more linguistic communities come into contact that this sort of valuing of language
becomes apparent since it is through being conscious of 'an alternative to one's own
linguistic way of life that one begins to identify the latter as a distinct form of human
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creativity in which one can take pride'. (Reaume 2000, p. 250-251) By viewing language
in this fashion, one can begin to comprehend the force and legitimacy underpinning the
idea that specific languages should be protected.
STATE FORMATION PRACTICES
These factors are far from the only ones that affect the outcome of the
assimilation, or lack thereof, of national minorities. The nation building strategy used in
the United States during state fonnation also plays a role in the systematic destruction
and disempowerment of indigenous peoples.
Between the dates of 1835-1894 the United States government, acting under the
legal foundation provided by the Marshall Doctrine, either allowed or actively
participated in the decimation of the indigenous population of the United States. A United
States Census Bureau report issued in 1894 made the following statement. "The Indian
wars under which the United States government have been about 40 in number [most of
the occurring after 1835]. They have cost the lives of... about 30,000 Indians [at a
minimum] .... The actual number of killed and wounded Indians must be very much
greater than the number given, as they conceal, where possible, their actual loss in
battle ... Fifty percent additional would be a safe number to add to the numbers give."
(Churchill, 2000, p. 408) Government sanctioned citizen actions are known to have been
primarily responsible for the reduction of the native population of Texas from about
100,000 people in 1828, to fewer than 10,000 in 1890. (Churchill, 2000, p. 408)
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In fact, the State of Texas maintained a bounty on Indian Scalps well into the
1870's. (Churchill, 2000, p. 416) In California, the indigenous population was reduced
from 300,000 to fewer than 35,000 by 1860 by similar actions. (Churchill, 2000, p. 408)
Either of these studies indicates a death toll considerably higher than the governmentally
acknowledged death toll having accrued through citizen and military action combined in
this period. Ward Churchill comments 011 this same period "Even while this slaughter
was occurring, the government was conducting what it itself frequently described as a
"policy of extermination" in its conduct of wars against those indigenous nations that
proved "recalcitrant" about giving up their land and liberty. This manifested itself in a
lengthy series of massacres of native people ... at the hands of U.S. troops." (Churchill,
2000 p.408) In totality it has been estimated that between 250,000-500,000 natives were
killed as a direct result of U.S. military campaigns against Native Americans. (Churchill,
2000, p. 409) In total, by the tum of the century only 237,196 native peoples were still
recorded as living on the census, perhaps 20/0 of the total indigenous population of the
Ullited States at the point of first contact with Europeans, a number that correlates with
the reduction of native land holdings which dropped to approximately 2.5% in the lower
48 states during the same period. (Churchill, 2000 p. 409)
Kymlicka notes
"It would have been quite possible in the nineteenth century to create states dominated by the avaho, for
example, or by Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and native Hawaiians. At the time these groups were incorporated
into the United States, they formed majorities in their homelands. However, a deliberate decision was
made not to accept any territory as a state unless these national groups were outnumbered. In some cases,
this was achieved by drawing boundaries so that Indian tribes or Hispanic groups were outnumbered
(Florida). In other cases, it was achieved by delaying statehood until Anglophone settlers swamped the
older inhabitants (e.g. Hawaii; the south-west) In cases where the national minority was not likely to be
outnumbered, a new type of non-federal political unit was created, such as the 'commonwealth' of Puerto
Rico, or the 'Protectorate' of Guam." (Kymlicka, 1995, p28-9)
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By such reductions in status and population of national minorities, the United
States ensured that native populations would be unable to have an effective voice in the
policies that guided the United States' treatment of them in subsequent times. Then, by
attempting to maintain a policy of neutrality, the government effectively ensured that
national minorities would remain swamped by the broader anglophile culture whose
interests often conflicted with those of indigenous cultures.
One might argue that a hard utilitarian judgment will demonstrate that the
'benefits' that these groups received through assimilation somehow outweighed any
disadvantages they incurred from the loss of national identity.
Mill himself stated
"Experience proves it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another; and when it was
originally an inferior and more backward pOliion of the hun1an race the absorption is greatly to its
advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre,
to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people-to be a
member of the French nationality, adnritted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship ... than
to sulk on his own rock, the half-savage relic of past time, revolving in his own little mental orbit without
participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman
or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation." (Mill 1972:395, cf. Kymlicka 2001:206)
Mill's statement makes several very interesting assumptions concerning the
interests of those nations that are to be assimilated. First, he seems to adhere to a theory
of culture that assun1es cultures can be easily divided into those which are 'highly
civilized and cultivated' versus those which are not. Second, it seems as ifhe forgot to
ask those Bretons, Basques, etc, whether they thought it was more beneficial to be
assimilated into their new nation. Given the long history chronicling the enduring
struggle to maintain their societal cultures and self-governing rights, even after they have
had in some cases centuries of exposure to the 'highly civilized nations' practices, most
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national minority groups still identify themselves primarily as belonging to their
respective nations, rather than to the nationality that is attempting to assimilate them.
Third, he posits the assimilated nations as remaining somehow frozen in time, 'the half-
savage relic of past time, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or
interest in the general movement in the world.' This characterization of nations in danger
of assimilation seems impossible to maintain under any context, as those so endangered
typically take an acute interest in the affairs of the world. Consider the example of
Native Americans. From first contact with Europeans through to the present day, there
exists a long record of cultural exchange, often to the benefit of their European
colonizers. Further, they have consistently interacted with European powers in an attempt
to guide their own destinies and to set the terms for their interactions with them. The
long history of Native negotiations with the other governments of the world can serve as
a clear example that 'discovered' cultures have interests in foreign ideas and the forces
t11at affect their lives. What they also have an interest in, and what Mill and others seems
to ignore, is how they wish to respond to such new ideas. While some ideas or
technologies may be enthusiastically adopted, others may not be so adequately suited for
integration into the new culture. Indeed, such a culture may decide that some of the ideas
are misguided or ill suited for the contextual realities facing them, and wish to reject
them.
Native Americans have a long tradition of assimilating many European ideas and
technologies into their cultures. The concept ofhorsemanship for example, was rapidly
adopted in the New World after the introduction of the horse by the Spanish; to such a
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degree that popular imagery of Plains Indian cultures inevitably contains some reference
to the horse. Other ideas, such as the strong vision of individual property rights that t1).e
European colonizers brought with them to the New World, were adopted less
enthusiastically, if they were voluntarily adopted at all.s Mill seems to remain completely
blind to the fact that different value systems will render different judgments upon the
items presented to them. In classic colonial fashion, if the new culture doesn't
enthusiastically endorse all of the cultural practices of the dominant culture, then they are
characterized, to quote Lyotard, as " ...belonging to a different mentality: savage,
prilnitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated, composed of opinions, customs,
authority, prejudice, ignorance, ideology." (Lyotard 1993, p. 27) In short, other cultures
are best removed from the world so that the superior civilization-and this almost always
seems to be determined in a military fashion-can bring them all the benefits of a 'truly'
civilized culture.
PUBLIC EDUCATION
One only has to read the poignant accounts of Native Americans to realize the
damage that nation building can wreak. 6 For example, the Chilocco Indian School was
founded in 1882 in what is now the state of Oklahoma. It was one of many federal
boarding schools designed to 'civilize' Native Americans by providing them with a
'proper' education. K. Lomawaima observes
"A history of Indian education based on the documentary remains of policy statements and school records
might summarize the federal crusade as follows: The United States government established off-reservation
boarding schools in the late 1800s as part of its grand civilizing plan to transform Native American people.
Federal policymakers and administrators cooperated to remove thousands of Native American children and
5 It should be noted that Native American conceptions of property rights varied considerably from group to
group, but were typically more communal than European versions.
6 For a sustained account on this subject see Lomawaima, 1994
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young adults from their families, homes, and tribes in order to educate them in a new way of life. Indian
education flowed far beyond academic or vocational boundaries, soaking the child's growing up in the
cleansing bath of Christian labor. Tribal/communal identity, primitive language, heathen religion: these
pernicious influences would be rooted out and effaced in the construction of a new kind of American
citizen." (Lomawaima, 1994)
Even more benign examples of public education demonstrate a tendency to
systematically advantage the national majority. The language in which the schools are
conducted benefit those who understand the national language, and disadvantage those
whose understanding is imperfect. The calendar that the school utilizes will serve to
benefit some students more, and is typically reflective of the cultural traditions of the
dominant culture, the holidays that it recognizes usually represent the important
occasiOlls within the majority culture, and so Oll. All of these factors tend to pose barriers
to students who do not participate fully in the practices of the majority that are not
present for those who retain the privilege of operating within their original culture and
language.
Education also serves to systematically disadvantage certain cultures within
multinational states in a variety of other ways. Take something as simple and seemingly
innocUOllS as school calendars for example. Carol Locust explains,
"One of the nlost blatant issues ~f discrimination against American Indian belief systems involves
traditional belief times. School calendars include holidays based on a Christian tradition and on national
historical events. Children from other religious backgrounds-those who are Jewish, for instance-
typically enjoy the freedom to participate in religious activities without penalty for absences from their
classes. In most school systems American Indian children do not enjoy tills religious freedom and are
penalized for being absent from classes while palticipating in traditional tribal ceremonies." (Locust,
1996.p.322)
The curriculum taught by the schools is also likely to favor particular groups by
emphasizing the history of the dominant majority nation, classes are usually conducted in
language of the dominant majority, and methods of teaching are geared towards reaching
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the majority of the students, in the majori y of cases. Concerns about methods of
teaching and learning may not seem to be particularly hannful, or might be thought an
inevitable result of a public education, but is that truly the case? In the first instance,
educational practices are the result of man made institutions that have evolved in
culturally specific fashions. When the national majority exercises its powers to create
public education, it inevitably will construct a system that will benefit certain members
within its society u11equally. Next, consider the argument that "Belief systems are
integrated into the total being of the American Indian, and discrimination against those
beliefs occurs in ways that non-Indians do not easily understand. Indians view
immortality and existence as circular rather than linear and appear to learn best when
information is presented to them in a circular manner (Locust 1996, p. 322) ...Traditional
education of Indian youth is not linear and frequently not verbal. Indian children learn by
watching elders, by having grandparents identify for them the whole of the task, the
complete circle, the perfection of completion." (Locust, 1996, p. 322) Ifleaming patterns
can be shown to vary in culturally specific ways, then that factor would provide a strong
argument for granting national minorities their own school systems, so as to avoid
systematically disadvantaging them by forcing upon indigenous peoples an educational
system ill-suited to their educational needs in order to further the nation building program
of the liberal state.
Having presented arguments demonstrating how the creation and maintenance of
modem liberal nation states tends to favor dominant majorities, often to the detriment of
national minorities within multinational states, I will now discuss why the creatioll of
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group specific rights for national minorities will realize the liberal dream of equality
better than the standard individual-centered liberal conception.
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CHAP'rER FOUR
CHARLES TAYLOR'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM
Charles Taylor observes in The Politics ofRecognition that the demand for
recognition is playing an increasingly important role in contemporary politics. (Taylor
1995) He argues that it is one of the driving forces behind a variety of movements on the
political scene, including some forms of feminism, nationalist movements, minority or
'subaltern groups', and in the 'politics of multiculturalism' . (p. 249) In many of these
movements, Taylor attributes a sense of urgency to the demands for recognition, that are
grounded by the "supposed links between recognition and identity, where this latter tenn
[recognition] designates something like a person's understanding of who they are, of their
fundamental defining characteristics as a human being." (p. 249) The thesis that many of
the groups mentioned earlier have developed, according to Taylor, "is that our identity is
partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so
a person or group ofpeople can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or
society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible
picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a fonn
of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being." (p.
249) Consider indigenous and colonized people in general, concerning whom Taylor
notes that "since 1492 Europeans have projected an image of such people as somehow
inferior, "uncivilized", and through the force of conquest have often been able to impose
this image on the conquered." (p. 249-50)
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Taylor and others have noted that in many instances, oppressed minority groups
have been "induced to adopt a depreciatory image of themselves. They have internalized
a picture of their own inferiority, so that even when some of the objective obstacles to
their advancement fall away, they may be incapable of taking advantage of the new
opportunities. And beyond this, they are condemned to suffer the pain of low self-
esteem... Within these perspectives, misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect.
It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due
recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need." (p. 249-250)
Taylor develops the idea of authenticity in order to show why the need for
recognition is so vital to the flourishing of human beings. (p. 249-256) The ideal of
authenticity
"..accords moral importance to a kind of contact with myself, with my own inner nature, which it sees as in
danger of being lost partly through the pressures toward outward conformity but also because in taking an
instrumental stance toward myself, I may have lost the capacity to listen to this inner voice. It greatly
increases the importance of this self-contact by introducing the principle of originality: each of our voices
has something unique to say. ot only should I not mold my life to the demands of external conformity; I
can't even find the model by which to live outside myself. I can only find it within. Being true to myself
means being tlue to n1Y own originality, which is something only I can articulate and discover. In
articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my own." (p. 252)
This generation of an authentic way of being cannot simply be understood as
avoiding socially derived ways of being in favor of inwardly generated ways of being
because this would ignore what Taylor refers to as 'a crucial feature of the human
condition' , namely that the generation of identity is fundamentally dialogical in character.
(p. 253) He argues that "We become full human agents, capable of understanding
ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human
languages of expression." (p. 253)
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Language, in the sense that Taylor here employs, includes not only the linguistical
meaning of the term, but also'other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves' ,
such as art, love, gesture, etc. These modes of expression cannot be learned in isolation,
rather they require exchange with significant others in order to be realized. This leads
Taylor to the final conclusion that "The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not
monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical."
He also reminds us that " .. this is not just a fact about genesis, which can be ignored later
on. We don't just learn the languages in dialogue and then go on to use them for our own
purposes. Weare of course expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances
toward things, and to a considerable degree through solitary reflection. But this is not
ho\v things work with important issues, like the definition of our identity.' Our identities
are always developed through a dialogue with, and struggling against, 'the things our
significant others want to see in us.' In some cases even 'after we outgrow SaIne of these
others' the dialogue 'continues within us for as long as we live.' (p. 253) The identity
forged through this dialogue with significant others and our responses to it provides the
foundations for who we are and "As such it is the background against which our tastes
and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense." (p. 254)
So, the discovery of identity is not simply a dialogue with one's self, nor is it
simply a discussion with external others, instead it is a combination of the preceding two
dialogues combined with internal discussions that include the voices of those not
necessarily present. It is this feature that Taylor argues makes our dialogical relations
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with others so important in identity fonnation. lfthe relations we have with other
significant voices serves as an impediment, then the development of our identities can be
retarded, resulting in stifled and wasted human potential. One's inwardly derived,
personal identity has to be 'won' though a person's life, there is no guarantee that a
person will achieve and maintain an authentic mode of living. Taylor exclaims
"The importance of recognition is now universally acknowledged in one form or another; on an intimate
plane, we are all aware of how identity can be formed or malformed through the course of our contact with
significant others. On the social plane, we have a continuing politics of equal recognition. Both planes
have been shaped by the growing ideal of authenticity, and recognition plays an essential role in the culture
that has arisen around this ideal.,,7 (p. 255)
On the social level Taylor claims that what needs to be avoided by any politics of
universalism that emphasizes the equal dignity of all people is the creation of 'first-class'
and 'second-class' citizens. For some, what might be needed for equal recognition might
be the realization of civil and voting rights. For others, the realization of equal dignity
may require assistance from the socioeconomic realm, such as those people who are
systematically handicapped by poverty. (p. 256) In both cases, in order to realize the
liberal ideal of universal human dignity and equality certain remedial actions may be
needed to make this ideal a reality. This points to the need for asymmetrical rights
packages that realize the specific needs of the groups that they target. But Taylor notes
that the methods used to bring about this type of equality doesn't always seem to mesh
perfectly with the politics of equal dignity as he here explains, "With the politics of equal
dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of
rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is
the unique identity of this individual or group, their distillctness from everyone else. The
7 It should be noted that this quote seems to imply that Taylor believes that the politics of equal recognition
has already arrived. While Taylor does think that recognition is gaining increasing importance, he does
indicate in other related comments that this recognition is still being fought for.
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idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated
to a dominant or majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the
ideal of authenticity." (p. 257)
So how can we solve tllis apparent conundrum? The politics of universal dignity
fights to ensure that government policies were difference blind, that is, favoring no
particular group, not recognizing the ways in which people differ, and ensuring equal
treatment for all people. But what the politics of recognition requires is that in order to
be non-discriminatory, we must in fact make distinctions about both groups and
individuals based on the ways in which they differ, or as Taylor states "we give due
acknowledgement only to what is universally present-everyone has an identity-
through recognizing what is peculiar to each. The universal demand [for recognition]
powers an acknowledgement of specificity." (p. 258)
Taylor begins to attempt to solve this problem by examining the world of
education. There currently exists a lively debate on whether or not the literary 'canon' of
accredited authors should be altered ill some fashion. Those who favor this alteration
often argue on the grounds that the literary canon is composed almost entirely of 'dead
white males' and argue that a greater place needs to made in order to accommodate those
peoples of non-European cultures and women. Taylor notes
"The reason for these proposed changes is not, or not mainly, that all students may be missing something
important through the exclusion of a certain gender or certain races or cultures, but rather that women and
students from the excluded groups are given, either directly or by omission, a demeaning picture of
themselves, as though all creativity and worth inhered in males of European provenance. Enlarging and
changing the curriculum is therefore essential not so much in the name of a broader culture for everyone as
in order to give due recognition to the hitherto excluded." (p. 258)
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Taylor recognizes a second premise that aids in justifying arguments of this type;
namely, 'that we owe equal respect to all cultures' because the judgments of worth made
in the earlier example " ..were in fact corrupt, were marred by narrowness or insensitivity
or, even worse, a desire to downgrade the excluded. The implication seems to be that
absent these distorti11g factors, true judgments of value of different works would place all
cultures more or less on the same footing." (p. 259) But would such a claim be strictly, or
even loosely justified? Doesn't it seem likely that the production of some cultures within
a given field, such as art, architecture, ethics, etc, may in fact outstrip others? Possibly.
But Taylor is quick to note that there does seem to be something valid in the claim that
cultural worth is more or less equal also. He argues that the presumption does require
something akin to an act of faith, yet not an unjustified one. The basic presumption
involved in the second premise relies on the following, " .. the claim is that all human
cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have
something important to say to all human beings." (p. 259)
Notice that this presumption does not require one to be committed to saying that
all cultures are in fact of equal importal1ce. Neither does it commit one to the position
that every sub-culture or time period within a culture is of equal value. What it does
commit one to is 'a starting hypothesis with which we ought to approach the study of any
other culture.' In the case of cultures significantly different from our own, we may have
at the onset, not the slightest idea of what a cultures valuable contribution might be to the
human condition, because within them the very idea of 'what it is to be of worth will be
strange and unfamiliar to us.' So, to accuse Taylor of cultural relativism on the grounds
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of this presumption would be unfair since what he argues for is a method of approaching
cultures that is sensitive to the differing conceptions of valuation, rather than arguing that
all cultures are in fact of equal value. He does not argue that all cultures are of equal
value, but instead that cultures that have animated whole societies probably have some
valuable insights into the human condition. Taylor encourages us to follow a notion
developed by Gadamer involving "a fusion ofhorizons,,8, which involves 'learning to
move in a broader horizon.' (p. 259) Our starting horizon, which we have taken for
granted as providing the background for our valuations, need to become 'situated as one
possibility alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture'. The
"fusion of horizons" functions by 'developing new vocabularies of comparison, by means
of which we can articulate these contrasts. 9 Taylor explains that by adopting this
position toward the value of cultures it readies us "So that if and when we ultimately find
substantive support for our initial presumptions, it is on the basis of an understanding of
what constitutes worth that we couldn't possibly have had at the beginning. We have
reached the judgment partly through transforming our standards." (p. 259-60)
EVALUATION AND APPLICATION OF TAYLOR'S THEORY TO NATIONAL
MINORITIES
But should we swallow this pill that Taylor has presented us with? It would
certainly involve a great deal of revision to U.S. culture as we now know it and the
change challenges some of the most important claims within the liberal tradition;
8 Wahrheit und Methode (Tubingen: Mohr, 1975), p289-90
9 For more on this notion see Taylor, Charles. "Comparison, History and Truth' in Myth and Philosophy.
ed. Frank Reynolds and David Tracy (Albany: State University of ew York Press, 1990) and in
"Understanding and Ethnocentricity" in Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985)
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specifically those beliefs regarding the proper conception of what sort of universality best
upholds the dignity ofman. Should we accept Taylor's vision that promotes an
asymmetrical package of rights that recognizes the distinctions between individuals and
groups based on the ways in which they differ or should we fight to ensure that
government policies are difference blind, that is, favoring no particular group, not
recognizing the ways in which people differ, and ensuring equal treatment for all people.
In an attempt to answer this complex problem, I propose to construct a series of
three questions designed to test Charles Taylor's theory with regards to the issues
involving national minorities residing inside of the United States. The questions are:
1. Does misrecognition occur and if so, how damaging is it to national minorities?
2. How likely is the construction of authentic persons in the absence of respect?
3. Has liberalism been responsible for creating second~class citizens by adopting
difference blind principles?
Central to Taylor's argument is the claim that people are engaged in a dialogical
conversation between themselves and significant others over the course of their entire
lives, and that this conversation can, and in tIle case of many national minorities often is,
damaging to their development as authentic persons, if the voices of those 'significant
others' tends to deny or misrecognize the value of their way of living. What evidence
could be found in support of such a claim? While unequivocal answers in this sort of
inquiry are rarely, if ever, to be had, it seems at least plausible that one could develop a
strong case for this claim. I recommend that we first investigate the present phenomena
of the stereotyping ofNative Americans and see how it relates to Taylor's claims.
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Stereotyping, while hardly just a phenomena associated with liberalism, can
provide us with a way to understand Taylor's argument about the linkage between
recognition and identity. A stereotype can be defined as, "2: Something repeated and
produced without variation: something conforming to a fixed or general pattern and
lacking individual distinguishing marks or qualities; esp.: a standardized mental picture
held in common by members of a group representing an oversimplified opinion, affective
attitude, or uncritical judgment (as of a person, a place, an issue, or an event)"
(Webster's, p. 2238) Especially important within this definition for our purposes is the
idea that a stereotype tends to form 'an oversimplified opinion' that holds to 'a fixed or
general pattern' and that is 'lacking individual distinguishing marks or qualities' _ This
definition is particularly well suited to the kind of vision of misrecognition that Taylor is
developing. When a people engage in stereotyping, they fail t6 see the essential dignity
and individuality that each person possesses. Instead of trying to critically investigate
this person or culture, they instead rely upon a generalization, and probably one that is in
error, to provide the background for their evaluations, and dealings with the stereotyped
entity_ Stereotypes concerning Native Americans abound in the national majority culture
of the United States, but the real damage that they can inflict is rarely recognized.
Michael Dorris comments,
"In the ever- ever Land of glib stereotypes and caricature, the rich histories, cultures, and the
contemporary complexities of the indigenous, diverse peoples of the Western Hemisphere are obscured,
misrepresented, and rendered trivial. Native Americans appear not as human beings but as whooping, silly,
one-dimensional cartoons. On occasion they are presented as marauding, blood-thirsty savages bogeys
from the nightmares of "pioneers" who invaded their lands and feared for the consequences. At other times
they seem preconcupiscent angels, pure of heart, mindlessly ecological, brave and true. And worst of all,
they are often merely cute, the special property of children. (Dorris 1999, p. vii)
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These stereotypes are not only damaging to Native Americans, in the sense that
they deny or devalue the important contributions of both the past and present Native ~
societies; but they are also damaging to the bearers of those stereotypes, as they are
denied the benefits of access to the wealth and sophistication that Native cultures have to
offer. Dorris notes,
"A society that chooses to make a running joke of its victims embalms both its conscience and its
obligations, relegating a tragic chronology of culture to ersatz mythology. It's hard to take seriously to
empathize with, a group of people portrayed as speaking ungrammatical language, as dressing in
Halloween costumes as acting "wild", as being undependable in their promises or gifts. Frozen in a kind
of pejorative past tense, these make-believe Indians are not allowed to change or in any other way be like
real people. They are denied the dignity and dynamism of their history, the validity of their myriad and
major contributions to modern society, the distinctiveness of their multiple ethnicities." (Dorris 1999)
To show the pervasiveness of the stereotypes facing Native Americans I will offer
four examples that should prove sufficient to establish that Native Americans are often
'misrecognized' by the national majority in the United States and that this
'misrecognition' does tend to hinder the development of authentic human beings as well
as contributing to other social problems for these groups.
First, consider the tenn 'Indian"s origin. Although there is some dispute, it is
generally conceded that Christopher Columbus coined the term to describe the native
inhabitants he 'discovered' when he arrived in the New World. The story typically goes
that upon landing, he assumed that he had arrived in India, and so mistakenly gave them
this title. Other scholarship indicates that Columbus "named them Indios not because he
imagined them to be the inhabitants of India (which in the fifteenth century was still
called Hindustan) but because he recognized that the friendly, generous Taino people
lived in blessed harmony with their surroundings-una gente in Dios, a people of God."
(Matthiessen, 1984, p. 29)
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Regardless of which interpretation is more accurate, it is the first reading that has
infused the popular psyche of the national majority within the United States. The fact
that that tenn is still used should seem puzzling once it was recognized that the place
Columbus landed was not India, as he may have thought, but rather what would become
known as the New World. Even at this early juncture a certain level of disrespect was
becoming apparent, since when arriving in a new inhabited land one might reasonably
consider calling it by the same name as the one used by its inhabitants, if one is interested
in showing them respect. Of course, given the history of the word in subsequent times, it
should surprise no one that it now carries with it a negative connotation amongst most
Native Americans. But whether through the force of custom, indifference and/or ill will
on the part of the invaders toward native cliston1, or simple laziness, the term has carried
down through the subsequent 510+ years despite protest by natives.
The Pequot author William Apes made the comment that "1 thought it disgraceful
to be called an Indian; it was considered as a slur upon an oppressed and scattered nation,
and I have often been led to inquire where the whites received the word. I could not find
it in the bible, and therefore concluded, that it was a word imported for the special
purpose of degrading us." (Apes 1831, p. 27) Although this comment was made in 1831,
it mirrors some of the sentiments of Native Americans today. Ojibway Lenore Keeshig-
Tobias in Ronald Wrights' Stolen Continents, published in 1990, made the comment
"How I loathe the tenn 'Indian' ... Indian is a term used to sell things-souvenirs, cigars,
cigarettes, gasoline, cars ... ' 'Indian' is a figment of the white mans imagination. (Tobias
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1990, p. 29) Both of these authors demonstrate what is a common sentiment throughout
the Native American community concerning the moniker that is perhaps the most
common of all of those used to describe their groups outside of professional circles. Yet it
still remains a common tenn and one that is rarely given any thought by the national
majority in the United States.
While the United States has rightfully focused on removing many ethnically and
racially degrading terms from being employed in the naming of buildings, landmarks, and
aimed at people, in the case of Native Americans little progress has been made. Most
people today would be shocked when other people call a black person 'nigger' or a
Chinese person 'chine', but few people ever consider the negative connotation of the term
'Indian' in the case of Native Americans. One only has to look at the mass of sports and
location names teams that include the tenn 'Indians', 'Redskins', or 'Chiefs' to gain an
understanding of the scope of this phenomenon.
But why should Native Americans be upset over the use of this tenn or others like
it? . Consider some of the stereotypes common to Native Americans in the military,
such as the fact that "American Indian males are called 'chief' by both officers and
enlisted men although military personnel "are required to display their last name on
virtually every article of clothing, from headgear to boots.", as Winnebago veteran
Gerben Earth explains. (Earth 1999, p. 41) While this may not seem to be so bad at first
glance, Paulette Molin notes, in a work discussing the dangers of stereotyping Native
Americans in the military, that" ... this stereotypical practice, along with the failure to
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correctly identify the names of individuals or their associated tribal nations, denies
American Indians the dignity of their own names, [and] distinct tribal identities ..."(Molin
1999,p.42)
Beyond the danger of loss of dignity, very real physical dangers can arise from
such stereotyping as the assumption that Native Americans will instinctively be well
suited to being military scouts. Molin comments" ... racist stereotypes have contributed
to a preponderance of the most difficult and dangerous assignments, including scouting
on long range reconnaissance missions, walking point on patrols, and fighting in high
casualty units during wartime. Besides having a disproportionately high number of
soldiers in the armed services in relationship to tribal populations, American Indians have
suffered high casualty rates in wars largely due to the manner of their service." (Molin
1999,p.42)
Powhatan author Jack D. Forbes commented in 1982 "Indians themselves have
gradually been forced to 'live with' or even to accept alien names because of the pressure
stemming from white 'custom' (and occasionally because of editors demands for
unifonnity)" (Forbes 1999, p. 28) This type of denial of dignity certainly seems to qualify
as at least one type of pressure acting upon Native Americans that tends to produce
negative images and thereby distorts the authentic identity formation of many Native
Americans.
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Of course the discrimination that Native Americans suffer in the military hardly
comprises the web of interlocking prejudices that serve to imprison many of them in
inauthentic personalities. For my second example of a type ofpatterned discrimination
that tends to negatively affect some Native Americans in the development of authentic
personalities, I will examine the widespread use of the term 'squaw'.
Paulette Molin comments that 'the term Squaw has extensive use in North
America. Besides countless place names, including California's popular ski resort
"Squaw Valley," it has been perpetuated in printed matter and public discourse since the
colonial period.' While there is some dispute about the origins of the term, it has been
attributed to a "French corruption of the word otiskwa meaning 'female sexual parts', a
word almost clinical [usually translated as 'vagina'] both denotatively and
connotatively"lO (Molin 1999, p. 34) Molin continues " ... the term 'squaw' has been
universally applied to Native females in North America by Europeans and European-
An1ericans and continues to be used as a generic label, a pejorative epithet ...The word
has negative connotations that stereotype indigenous women ...For Native women, who
are the victims of this disparaging labeling, it means having to fight the stereotype on
behalf of themselves and their sisters. For Native men, it mea11S that their female
relatives are treated with the utmost disrespect." (p. 34) While Native Americans have
protested the use of this tenn, in only a few cases have those protests been effective, due
largely to their minority status within the larger political body.
10 Bracketed material is author's insert derived from Star Litzau's testimony concerning Minnesota Law
Chapter 53-S.F. No.574. Enacted April 18, 1995.
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My third example focuses on the education of children and the damage that can be
inflicted upon both the subjects who have stereotypical beliefs and the objects of the
stereotypes, in this case, Native Americans. By 'education', I do not simply mean the
sort of activities that goes on within a school but rather adopt a broader vision that
encompasses all of the learning experiences in which a person participates.
One possible explanation for the current origin of many stereotypes about Native
Americans can be found in the seemingly innocent environment of children's education.
Michael Dorris explains,
"When infants are ready to focus their eyes on concrete objects, they are very likely to see angry-looking
"I" for Indians brandishing weaponry on plastic or cloth block sets. By the time these infants are seven
years old, they probably have seen hundreds of images of mean, silly, or noble Indians. It should come as
no surprise that non-Indian children programn1ed on these stereotypes at early, formative developmental
stages grow into adults who may unwittingly or knowingly discriminate against Indians. These children
have been prevented [rOITI developing healthy attitudes about Indians. It also should come as no surprise
that Indian children who constantly see their people stereotyped or treated in unfair ways grow into adults
who begin to feel and act as if they were not as good as other people. These Native children are hindered in
developing healthy self-images and racial identities ... " (Dorris 1999, p. xiii)
Numerous psychological studies also tend to confirm the connection described by
Taylor, indicating that stereotypical images can have a detrimental effect upon those
subjected to them. When children are developing their attitudes about racial and cultural
groups they "need to be exposed to a variety of experiences, infonnation, and images
about each cultural group in order to develop an understanding of rich cultural patterns
and diversity."l} In 'Toys with Indian Imagery', Arlene Hirschfelder points out that
children get their images concerning Native Americans from a wide variety of sources
including adults, teachers, museum displays, food packages, advertisements, television,
11 Quotation from "Suggestions for Developing Positive Racial Attitudes" Interracial Books for Children
Bulletin, v.II, n.4, 1980. pI 0
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radio, movies, books, and toys. (Hirschfelder 1999, p. 139) She suggests, "Many of these
sources frequently transmit unfavorable stereotypes and inaccurate information about
Native Americans thus preventing children from developing a realistic picture ofpast and
contemporary Native life. (p. 139) In a related work by Hirschfelder and Moore, it is
noted, "no one illustration is sufficient to create stereotypes in children's minds.
However, too many books, advertisements, movies, and toys have these images-and the
general culture reinforces them-so that there is a cumulative effect which encourages
false perceptions abollt Native Americans." (Hirschfelder & Moore 1982, p. 73) The
Public Action Coalition on Toys (PACT), an organization seeking to promote safe
children's toys, explains that toys
"play an important role in advancing a child's social, emotional, physical, and intellectual
development. .. Toys are tolls through which both social roles and intellectual skills are learned and outlets
provided for emotions ...Toys provide props and models for role-playing. Toys enable children to try on the
world, to test what they think and feel about themselves and others ... Since toys play such an important role
in the development of children it is immediately apparent that they can also be quite harmful. Toys that are
unsafe, racist, sexist, violent or anti-creative can be as negative to development as the toys described earlier
as positive." (PACT 1977, p. 140)
Given the preponderance of imagery and iconography that portrays Native
Americans as simple, silly, warlike, primitive, etc., in popular culture, especially in the
world of childre11, it is hardly surprising that many people tend to view Native cultures as
anachronistic at best, and see the United States as having done Natives a favor by
bringing them the benefits of westem 'civilization'. Mary Boyle argues "A n10re direct
assault is made upon the humanity of American Indians by the use of key words and
phrases which trigger negative and derogatory images. Words such as savage, buck,
squaw, and papoose do not bring to mind the same images as do the words man, boy,
woman, and baby." (Byler 1999, p. 166) The use and continued acceptance of derogatory
and stereotypical imagery, iconography, and language can combine to have a potentially
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devastating effect upon the development of authentic Native persons by undennining the
dignity of their cultures. Hirschfelder concludes
"Toy manufactures should consider the harm they may be doing to Native American and non-Native
children who either play with toys that have been discussed [those with negative associations] or see them
in stores or advertised in the media. It would be difficult for non- ative children playing with the toys that
have been discussed to develop positive attitudes toward Native Americans and it would be exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, for Native children to feel good about their identity when confronted with so
many toys that belittle their cultures. Not only does the lack of responsibility in the manufacture of Indian
toys lead to damaged self-concepts among Native Americans, it also reinforces the stereotypes which will
help to make racist adults of white children." (Hirschfelder 1999, p. 167)
Having argued that Native Americans are in fact the subjects ofmisrecognition by
the national majority within the United States, I now will address the question concerning
the likelihood of constructing an authentic perso11ality in the absence of respect.
It is plausible to wonder whether or not it is l1ecessary to respect a person or
culture in order for that entity to develop an authentic personality. We can all conle up
with examples from our childhood--or perhaps yesterday-when we have encountered
situations in which our beliefs, customs, racial identity, etc., have been treated in a
disrespectful fashion. Perhaps these insults or attitudes can be painful reminders that we
live in an imperfect world full of dogmatism, racism, sexism, and bigotry; but surely we
can overcome these hurdles. Toughen up, get a thicker skin, simply ignore them... But is
this really possible in those cases where one's mode of being is assaulted in a routine
fashion that seems to receive a kind of 'official' seal of approval, manifested though the
social institutions of the national majority, that actively undennine other identities? To be
sure, overcoming adversity is an integral part of embracing an authentic mode of being,
for after all, the dialogues we enter into with significant others need not always be
pleasant. But what is the result when the majority of our experiences with others tend to
systematically ridicule or demean important aspects of my identity?
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Sandra Bartky, in a paper discussing the corrosive effects of oppression on the
identities of its subjects observes,
"Stereotyping is morally reprehensible as well as psychologically oppressive on two counts, at least. First
it can hardly be expected that those who hold a set of stereotyped beliefs about the sort of person I am will
understand my needs or even respect my rights. Second, suppose that I, the object of some stereotype,
believe in it myself-for why should I not believe what everyone else believes? I may then fmd it difficult
to achieve what existentialists call an authentic choice of self, or what some psychologists have regarded as
a state of self-actualization." (Bartky 1996, p. 128)
She notes that philosophers have long recognized the importance of autonomy
and moral agency in ethical theory, but notes that they have tended to focus on the
political and economic aspects of oppression, and the effects of psychological oppression
upon agency have been until recently, largely ignored. She recognizes that the damage
inflicted by fOnTIS of psychological oppression, such as stereotyping, could be as equally
damaging as either political or economic oppression, and that in many cases it
accompanies and reinforces the other forms. While she concludes that economic and
political oppression threaten the autonomy of its victims n10re directly, she also observes
"But stereotyping, in its own way, threatens our self-determination too. Even when economic and political
obstacles on the path to autonon1Y are removed, a depreciated alter ego still blocks the way. It is hard
enough for me to determine what sort of person I am or ought to try to become without being shadowed by
an alternate self, a truncated and inferior self that I have, in some sense, been doomed to be all the time.
For many, the prefabricated self which, with work and encouragement, might sometime have emerged."
(Bartky 1996, p. 128)
Autonomy, on this model, can be undermined not only by the existence of
stereotypes but also by the content of the stereotypes and the inten1alization of such
content. In the context of our conversation, stereotypes that present Native Americans as
child-like, simple, primitive, savage, etc., are not only dangerous because they encourage
the national majority to view and treat Natives as in some way inferior, but also because
they encourage Native Americans themselves to act in such a fashion in order to fulfill
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their socially constructed identities 'prerequisites', or to become ashamed of their cultural
inheritance. The internalization of the beliefs of the majority can serve as a powerful
detriment in the development of authentic modes of being. When the national majority
tends to view and promote the perception that the general way of life of the national
minority-the art, customs, language, forms of governance, etc.-as being inferior to
those of the national majority, it can operate as an oppressive force upon those who are so
targeted, increasing feelings of alienation and powerlessness.
Particularly damaging in the case of Native Americans is the tendency of the
dominant majority to distort or simply ignore the important contributions that Native
Americans have made in the development of the United States, while simultaneously
emphasizing the contributions that the national majority has provided. For example,
there is strong evidence supporting the claim that the founders of the political institutions
of the United States were influence by Native American ideas and institutions,
particularly those of the Iroquois Confederacy. 12 However, this influence has been
ignored in textbooks and histories which only stress the impact of European and early
American scholars. European culture is consistently portrayed as 'advanced' in the
majority of textbooks in use in the United States, while the indigenous populations are
inevitably characterized as primitive or simple, if they are directly mentioned at all.
Native American fonns of art and literature are typically excluded from many general
texts on the subject, despite the existence of a large body of work by Native Americans in
12 See Jack Weatherford (1988), Robert Venables (1992), Jose Barriero (1988), & Ginde & Johansen
(1991 )
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both of these fields. Similarly, the wide variety of stereotypes mentioned in the earlier
chapter serves to constantly erode the dignity and value of Native cultures.
One of the factors that make psychological oppression so dangerous is the fact
that it is not always obvious. Bartky explains that psychological oppression" .. .is
dehumanizing and depersonalizing; it attacks the person in her personhood. I mean by
this that the nature of psychological oppression is such that the oppressor and the
oppressed alike come to doubt that the oppressed have the capacity to do the sorts of
things that only persons can do, to be what persons, in the fullest sense of the term, can
be." (Bartky 1996, p. 132) The systematic undermining of Native American autonomy in
the realm of government can serve as an example of this type of oppression. Native
Americans have throughout U.S. history seen their ability to manage their own affairs
slowly wither under the growing power of the United States. Their current status, as a
domestic dependent nation serves as a constant reminder of the United States
unwillingness to recognize Native autonomy. The constant supervision by and need to
have governance decisions approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs indicates that they,
unlike the dOlninant majority, must always remain in a subordinate position.
Even the forms of organization which Native American government must adhere
to has been organized by outsiders. Native religion, education, and customs have all been
regulated by the United States and have come under varying degrees of pressure
throughout US history, and in many periods their outright destruction has been attempted.
One example of such an effort can be found during the administration of U.S. President
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Grant, who parceled out reservations among various Christian denominations, whose
members were appointed as agents to supervise the Native people under their control.
The missionary lobby subsequently succeeded in having Congress declare Native
American religious practices illegal, a situation that persisted in full force until 1934.
After that date, selective religious services and ceremonies have been allowed, but at no
time has a full reinstatement of Native religious practices been allowed. Similar forms of
persecution regarding Native styles of education and the use of Native languages in
public affairs have also persisted with varying intensity into the present.
Native American cultural achievements are also seldom mentioned in textbooks,
and when they are mentioned at all, it is often an inaccurate or simply false
representation. These representations inevitably strip native cultures to a bare caricature
or an archaic relic. 13 By ensuring that what images Native Americans are able to catch
of themselves in popular culture are distorted or demeaning, the national majority
continually erodes Natives sense of dignity, making the development of an authentic
personality virtually impossible. Having seen their cultural achievements devalued, if
they are noted at all, and presented with grim demographic statistics such as those
presented in the last chapter, it becomes difficult to maintain pride and dignity in one's
Native heritage. This leads some Native Americans to a strange situation. Bartky
explains,
"It is itself psychologically oppressive both to believe and at the same time not to believe that one is
inferior-in other words, to believe a contradiction. Lacking an analysis of the larger system of social
relations which produced it, one can only make sense of this contradiction in two ways. First, while
accepting in some quite formal sense the proposition that "all men are created equal," I can believe,
inconsistently, what my oppressors have always believed: that some types of persons are less equal than
13 See American Indian Stereotypes in the World ofChildren. Scarecrow Press. 1999 for an in-depth
description of this phenomenon
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others. I may then live out my membership in my sex or race in shame; I am only a woman" or just a
nigger." Or, somewhat more consistently I may reject entirely the belief that my disadvantage is generic'
but having still to account for it somehow, I ll1ay locate the cause squarely within myself a bad destiny of
an entirely private sort-a character flaw, an "inferiority complex", or neurosis." (Bartky 1996 p.132)
Either of these outcomes can result in what Marxist's would refer to as 'false
consciousness'. When confronted with repeated representations of Natives as being
somehow inferior, they can become systematically deceived about the nature and origin
of their oppression. Rather than recognizing the external causes of oppression, "our
struggles are directed inward toward the self, or toward other similar selves in whom we
may see our deficiencies mirrored, not outward upon those social forces responsible for
our predicament. Like the psychologically disturbed, the psychologically oppressed often
lack a viable identity." (Bartky 1996, p. 133)
The Native American community has not been entirely unaware of the damages
being dealt to them by this phenomenon, as evinced in the following.
"It is time for Indian people to begin approving of and accepting themselves as human beings. For too long
we have allowed ourselves to be guided by other people's standards and ideals. We must begin discarding
archaic stereotypes of who and what Indians are. All across Indian country, this is one of the major
concerns: to change and improve the image of the North American Indian in the eyes of Indians and non-
Indians alike. Up until the present day, the American public has been fed, and has accepted as fact,
inaccurate information about Native Americans .... The damage that can be done by attributing stereotyped
characteristics to another, or to oneself, is immeasurable. When looked at through image-colored glasses,
an individual is never seen as an individual; he is not seen for what he is but for what he "ought" to be. All
stereotypes and prejudgments only get in the way of allowing people the freedom to be who they
are ... considerable work is yet to be done among non-Indians, as well as among ourselves, to rid us of this
nonproductive activity called Stereotyping. The fist step is to assist non-Indians in ridding themselves of
their negative concepts about who and what we are and to assist them in seeing us as human beings."
(Morris 1975, p. 13)
If Taylor is right and liberalism has in fact been responsible for the creation of
second-class citizens through its difference blind principles, then this represents a
fundamental challenge to the liberal tradition. Liberalism traditionally defends difference
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blind principles on the grounds that they help to ensure that no individual is unfairly
discriminated against. Ideally one's gender, race, social standing, etc., are conceived to
have no bearing upon the rights which one possesses; rather, a principle of universal
human dignity is typically invoked, a principle that connects the rights one possesses to
one's status as a human being instead of to any other 'coincidental' characteristics that
one may possess. But it is this basic premise of liberal thought that Taylor finds
responsible for the warping of identities and establishing the basis for second-class
citizenship.
I find Taylor's critique of liberalism, on this count, to be on the mark. Liberalism
has, in its attempts to create a difference blind society severely limited some of its
members, while systematically benefiting other members of the society. By liberalism's
own standards-particularly the principle of neutrality-liberalism can be found guilty of
privileging a particular societal culture, often to the exclusion of others. Further, I
believe that this privileging is a nearly unavoidable byproduct of the organization of any
large, multinational society. The arrangements arrived at concerning the division of
labor, religious practices, economic structure, workweek, gender roles, and cultural
practices in general will typically tend to advantage some members of a society while
disadvantaging others. In multinational states, this arrangement is in filOst instances
going to disadvantage the national minority, since they are usually less able to defend
themselves against the dominant nation. Liberalism, by maintaining that the proper focus
for issues of social justice is the individual, has left the door open for national minorities
and others interests to be systematically violated. By ignoring the important differences
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that exist between groups within a society, liberalism has divested itself of one of the
most powerful t~ols for identifying social inequalities, namely the analysis of group
demographics. If certain groups within a society can be s110wn to be the victims of
patterned inequalities that transcend the ability of difference blind policies to remedy, or
if such difference blind policies in fact mask the preferences of and serve the dominant
nation's interest with egregious harms resulting for national minorities, such as the denial
of language and land rights, then that provides a strong reason for arguing that group
rights should be extended to national minorities in order to remedy the inequalities
between the groups in order to realize the liberal ideals of respect, equality, and
autonomy. While the latter of these claims has been reasonably establish in the earlier




JUSTIFICATION OF GROUP RIGHTS WITHIN LIBERALISM
Iris Young argues in 'Equality ofWhorn?' that recent philosophical debates
concerning the normative ideals of equality have largely focused 'on questions of what
we should be aiming at when we wish to make people more equal'. Questions such as
whether equality should be conceived of in terms ofwelfare, resources, or capabilities
havre served to reveal the vast array of 'conceptual and practical tensions which lurk in
this most fundamental of questions'. These debates, while useful, have neglected another
very important side of the question, namely the question ofwhorn we are discussing
when we are comparing people's situation with regard to any and all of these targets of
equality. (Young 2001, p. 1)
Young comments "Theorists usually assume that the units we should be
comparing when we make judgments of inequality are individuals. Many assessments of
inequalities and claims for redress on grounds that an inequality is unjust, however,
compare groups of individuals according to one or more measures of equality." (p. 1) She
notes that one of the most common- ways to identify inequalities is by group conscious
judgments. It is standard practice to claim that women lack equality with men, blacks
with whites, old with young, etc. Social institutions routinely categorize their data by
disaggregating general welfare measures according to gender, ethnicity, race, occupation,
etc. All of these factors tend to legitimate the idea that when one is looking for social
justice, it is the group that should serve as an indicator of whether justice is being served,
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rather than the more traditional philosophical focus upon individuals. But is this intuition
correct? Young agrees that 'the ultimate purpose for making assessments of inequality is
to promote the well-being of individuals considered as irreducible moral equals' but in
order to accomplish this we must compare groups in order to arrive at some of the most
important judgments ofjustice and injustice. (p. 6)
Some question whether considerations of substantive equality are relevant when
making judgments about justice. On this view, of which Mill could serve as an exemplar,
justice is primarily concerned with the securing of liberty. Young observes, "Ifjustice
includes reference to equality, it is only as fonnal procedural equality. As long as
procedural equality is observed in law and the enforcement of contracts, on this account,
and as long as people are free to try to realize their goals though voluntary exchange and
associations, then considerations of inequality on some measures of power, influence or
material well-being are irrelevant to judgments ofjustice." (Young 2001, p. 7) This
position, as has been argued, tends to ignore numerous interests central to the human
condition, such as recognition, respect, and access to participatory goods, all of which
have a considerable affect upon our personal development. Given these cardinal failings,
it seems reasonable to supplement liberalism with an inclusion of group-based rights in
order to help fulfill liberalism's promise of social justice and equality.
But this is not an easy project to undertake. Even if one agrees that classic
liberalism does neglect certain important areas of the human experience, and that group
rights may help to remedy the situation, the exact type and conditions under which
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groups can obtain a given right still remain a major stumbling block for such a theory.
The fact that inequalities exist between individuals or groups, does not necessarily signal
that an injustice has been perpetrated. In fact, inequalities in terms of comparisons
between individuals offer little basis for judging whether an injustice has occurred.
Young provides the following example,
HSuppose we discover that some individuals are starving and others have access to more food than they
need. We have discovered a serious inequality, and one that indeed is likely to provoke moral judgment
that something is wrong. It is wrong, unjust some would say, that some people should starve when others
have more than they need. Those who are well offhave a prima facie obljgation to give to the starving
people. If there is such an obligation... it derives not from the fact of inequalities as such, but from the fact
of need...They are judgments about obligations to help people reach a certain level of what Harry Frankfurt
calls' sufficiency,' however, rather than judgments that an inequality is wrong as such." J4 (Young 2001, p.
7)
Once this minimum of sufficiency is reached, Young argues, the existence of
inequalities does not necessarily signal an injustice. She posits a situation in which
everyone compared has met the minimum standards of sufficiency, hO'wever that is
defined. Some individuals mig11t have incomes one hundred times those with the lowest
incomes, while others might have t\venty times the incomes, and so on. The simple fact
of these inequalities alone is not enough to demonstrate an injustice has occurred. But,
when one adds the supposition that 'some individuals w110 are not democratically
legitimate public officials have significantly more influence than others over important
policy decisions', or 'some people require more time, effort and planning to get to a
polling place or a public hearing than others', then Young suggests that injustices have
probably occurred in bringing about the inequalities of wealth mentioned. (p. 7) But
these potential injustices will not be apparent through the comparison of individual
14 See Harry Frankfurt's 'Equality as a Moral Ideal' Ethics, 98 (1987). p. 21-42. for more on this idea.
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circumstances if they do not make reference to 'attributes or affinities they share with
others or generalized social relations in which they stand'. (p. 7-8)
Young notes that if we identify inequalities of condition or situation between
individuals at a particular time, this gives us no account of the causes of unequal
conditions. She concludes that, "It is the causes and consequences of some pattern of
inequality, rather than the pattern itself, that raise issues ofjustice. If the causes of an
inequality lie in the uncoerced and considered decisions and preferences of the less well-
offpersons, for example, then the inequality is probably not unjust." (Young 2001, p. 8)
Many other equality theorists, such as Ronald Dworkin, would agree with this basic
point, and go to great pains in attempting to distinguish those causes of inequalities that
an individual is responsible for from those for which the individual is not responsible.
However, many causes of unequal distribution of resources can't be said to be the
result of indivridual choices or luck. Young notes,
';; ... the causes of Inany inequalities of resources or opportunities among individuals lie in social institutions,
their rules and relations, and the decisions others make within them that affect the lives of the individuals
compared. When a government body holds a hearing in the center of the city on issues that affect a poor
rural population, neither dispersing officials to other locations nor providing transportation to the affected
group, then this group's opportunity to influence the decision is not equal to those who live close to the
center. They are not victims of bad luck, however, but of institutional routines that convenience public
officials and business leaders, a history of transportation planning or the lack of it, regional development
inequalities, and so on. People similarly positioned in social structures frequently experience multiple
forms of exclusion, unequal burdens or costs deriving from institutional organization, rules, or decisions,
and the cumulative consequences of each." (Young 2001, p. 8)
Utilizing this mode of thought requires one to recognize the very human
influences upon peoples' life prospects. Many of the social evils facing any modem
society spring from the manner in which they have arranged themselves, from the
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culmination of generations of decisions and responses to the challenges posed by human
activity. While oftentimes these social forces go effectively unnoticed--which ca11 be
dangerous but does not always result in serious harm-at other times they have been
specifically organized to undermine whole peoples in an attempt to forcibly assimilate
them into the national majority at any cost-which can prove deadly to those culture so
targeted. In either of these cases any liberal society must recognize that as a result of its
social arrangements, some people are disadvantaged in a way that denies true equality.
Consider the following fact. In the United States roughly 800/0 of the wealth is
owned by roughly 20% of the population. Young observes, "It is disingenuous, however,
to hold that this manner of aggregating individuals and comparing their conditions in
itself gives grounds for a judgment of injustice." (Young 2001, p. 8) Why not? If
everyone has enough to meet their needs, and if there is nothing standing in the way of
the less wealthy to becoming more wealthy, the initial acquisitions of resources were just,
and if in short, the conditions for competing over social resources are truly equal, then
such an unequal distribution of resources could not be said to be unjust. To reach a
judgment that something is wrong with this distribution of wealth, Young argues,
" ... we must ask more about the lives of those in the wealthy group as compared with the group with little
wealth. When we learn that more of the wealthy had wealthy parents, were educated at the most elite
universities, and so on, and we compare their life opportunities with those in the less wealthy group, then
we can begin to make judgments ofjustice. We have moved from assessment of inequality in terms of
aggregations of individuals to con1parisons of social groups, in this case social classes." (Young 2001, p. 8-
9)
Only by examining groups can we detect the influence of structural inequalities
that serve to systematically undermine the efforts and equality of certain members within
any given society. In matters of social justice, one camlot remain blind to the fact, as do
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many libertarians" ... that many persons do not have and cannot use their freedom in the
ways he [the libertarian] exalts, and that these negative facts derive from, or are vitally
effected by, the structural inequalities of existing institutional arrangernents.,,15 (Gewirth
1996, p. 34) The existence of these structural inequalities can serve to undermine one's
effective ability to utilize the benefits provided by liberal societies. Having one's formal
equality recognized, while useful in some ways, is a poor substitute for possessing actual
equality within a society.
Jean Hampton notes that liberalism, under those conceptions which only
recognizes conditions of 'formal equality' "can fail to acknowledge that all sorts of social
structures in our society, including our legal institutions, family structures, and systems
of educating the young, have been worked out by generations of people responding to a
variety of problems in ways that are complicated, nuanced, and often highly successful."
(Halnpton 1997, p. 189-190) This lack of acknowledgment not only can lead to the
eventual destruction of many successful modes of being, thereby diminishing the
availability of successful adaptations, but can also serve to oppress certain groups within
society. This leads Hampton to conclude that an adequate social theory must attend to
issues of individual freedom, but also to "the hann of oppression coming from systemic
effects of certain kinds of social institutions in which individuals find themselves and
operate. These social forms are such that individuals, despite any good intentions they
might have, are forced to act and react in ways that result in considerable damage to some
people." (p. 189-90) By acknowledging these structural inequalities one is able to better
distinguish, to quote Young, "individual attributes, actions, and choices from more
15 Bracketed material is the author's insert.
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socially collective or institutional conditions under which these occur, and which limit
individual options and action." (Young 2001, p. 10) By distinguishing those factors that
an individual is responsible for or had happen to him as a result of luck from those
resulting from social institutions, one becomes able to better identify forces leading to
unjust inequalities and options that might promote greater equality.
MARILYN FRYE'S EXPLANATION OF THE EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL
OPPRESSION
Marilyn Frye offers a useful analogy that might help to clarify why these
structural inequalities, some of which are seemingly benign, can serve as oppressive
forces upon some groups within society. (Frye 1996) In this work, she examines the
nature of oppression and discusses some of the insidious ways in which it operates on its
victims. Frye argues that to be oppressed is to find one's self " ... caught between or
among forces and barriers which are so related to each other that jointly tl1ey restrain,
restrict, or prevent the thing's motion or mobility. Mold. Immobilize. Reduce." (Frye
1996, p. 120) One of the most commonly experienced features within the world of
oppressed people lies in the phenomena that Frye identifies as the 'double bind'. She
identifies this as " ... situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them
expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation." (Frye 1996, p. 120)
In the case ofNative Americans, one example of a 'double bind' scenario could
be found in the reservation system. In Stereotypes, Distortions, and Omissions in US.
Textbooks it is noted that reservations represent a paradox for Native Americans, as
shown in the following quotation.
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"On the one hand, reservations are perceived as concentration camps and are a constant reminder of the
loss of land and of sovereignty. Yet reservations-as bad as they are-represent the only land ative
Americans have left. Land is an integral aspect of ative American cultures and despite widespread
poverty, reservations provide ative Americans with a sense of community and attachment to the
earth... Outside these [Native American] communities, ative Americans are forced to participate -in a
competitive system that discriminates against them and denies them necessary skills and education. The
resources of reservations are exploited by white ranchers and corporations, with little or no profit to ative
people, many of whom are forced to seek jobs off the reservations." (Council On Interracial Books for
Children 1999, p.1 06-1 07)
For those Natives who stay on the reservation in an attempt to maintain their
cultural heritage and communal ties, the specters ofpoverty, lack of education, and
cultural isolation loom. Those who leave the reservation risk widespread prejudice
against Natives and their cultural beliefs, face the threat of alienation, and potentially find
themselves contributing to the decline ofNative culture through their absence. Worse
yet, by leaving the reservation and attempting to function in the dominant majority
culture, they can be seen as acquiescing to the marginalization of Native culture.
Frye explains, "The experience of oppressed people is that the living of one's life
is confined and shaped by forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and
hence unavoidable, but are systematically related to each other in such a way as to catch
one between and among them. and restrict or penalize motion in any direction." (Frye
1996, p. 120) In the case of Native Americans, the stereotypes and prejudices perpetrated
by the national majority culture of the United States projects the image of Native
Americans as being 'primitive', 'silly', 'savage', 'lazy', 'closer to nature'-and therefore
more animal-like, 'underdeveloped', and 'backwards'. These projections not only
disincline the national majority to take Native claims seriously, but also serve to
undermine the life prospects of Native Americans by limiting job prospects, social
contacts, and the development of authentic modes of being.
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To better explain the systematic effects of oppression, Frye invokes the analogy
of a birdcage. The purpose of a birdcage is to restrict the flight capabilities of a bird, or
make the bird be unable to fly. If one studies the causes of this imprisonment by
examining each of the wires in isolation, then it seems difficult to determine how the
single wire would stop the bird, or hinder it in any significant way from flying. Frye
explains, "There is no physical property of anyone wire, nothing that the closest scrutiny
could discover, that will reveal how a bird could he inhibited or harmed by it except in
the most accidental way. It is only when you step back, stop looking at the wires one by
one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you can see
why the bird does not go anywhere... " (Frye 1996, p. 121) Examine anyone of the
stereotypes facing Native Americans and it will be difficult to show how it could
undermine their culture, individual dignity, or economic prospects. But by looking at the
wide variety of oppressive practices and structural inequalities that are aimed at Native
Americans, both intentionally and unintentionally, one becomes able to perceive the large
numbers of wires connecting in a certain fashion that serves to limit the life prospects of
Native Americans.
It is in this context of oppression that strictly individual rights fall short of
preventing systematic oppression, securing equality, preventing egregious harms, and
protecting human dignity. Iris Young comments, "An account ofsomeone's life
circumstances contains many strands of difficulty or difference from others that, taken
one by one, can appear to be either the result of decision, preferences, or accidents. When
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considered together, however, they reveal a net of constricting and reinforcing
relationships." (Young 2001, p. 10)
To illuminate this process, consider the reservation system. As it currently stands,
the reservation system serves to produce and reproduce the residential racial segregation
ofNative Americans. The structural confluence of many distinct actions, expectations,
and effects serve to limit the options of many Native Americans in the United States.
Policies enacted by the United States Government have forced Native Americans off of
most, and in many cases all, of the land they traditionally inhabited. Churchill observes
that the lands which they were subsequently relocated to "fell overwhelmingly within
arid and semi-arid locales considered to be the least productive in North America."
(Churchill 2000, p. 410) This removal of Native Americans to new lands that were in
many ways inferior to their native lands, made them considerably more depende11t upon
the 'largess' of the United States Government who frequently put draconian provisions
upon the conditions under which they received aid-such as the adoption of European
modes of agriculture ill fitted to their new locations that reinforced their dependence,
banning of traditional Native religions, adoption of Christianity, forced attendance at
boarding schools that taught only Eurocentric curriculum, banning of Native languages in
public and private affairs, etc.-all practices intentionally aimed at destroying Native
nations as such. While many of these practices were subsequently relaxed, they served to
alienate and reduce native cultures. These factors combined with the 'domestic
dependent' status, which served as a useful mechanism to export the wealth found on
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Native Lands to American business interests at little to no profit for Natives, has
effectively impoverished whole nations.
Their geographical isolation from commerce centers, which was originally also a
planned act by the United States government to 'protect' its citizens from Natives, still
serves to force many Native Americans to either give up their traditional lands and
customs or to face ghettoization and impoverishment. Government policies make it
difficult to attract new businesses to Native lands and the fact the Bureau of Indian
Affairs still must approve Native policies effectively prevents them from forming
stimulus packages that work to their benefit. The rampant poverty on reservations also
serves to confine Native Americans to the reservations, as transportation to major urban
areas is often unavailable or too expensive. Travel time between places of employment
that exist off of the reservations also disadvantage Native Americans since other
employees need not budget such a significant portion of their time to commuting.
Iris Young makes a similar point when speaking about the poor in ghetto
neighborhoods. "Politicians often are more responsive to the neighborhoods where more
affluent white people live; thus schools, fire protection, policing, snow removal, garbage
pickup, are poor in the ghetto neighborhoods. Economic restructuring independent of
these racialized processes contributes to the closing of major employers near the
segregated neighborhoods and the opening of employers in far away suburbs." (Young
2001, p. 11) As a result of these processes, Native Americans are often poorly educated,
live around demoralized people in dilapidated and dangerous circumstances, and have
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few prospects for employment. Without taking into account the structural inequalities
that are perpetuated by the social structures of the United States, one might find it
difficult to conclude that Native Americans' unequal position in society is a matter of
injustice, instead of the result ofpreferences, choices, and luck that affects each
individual. Young concludes,
"While attributes of individuals also condition how they will be identified and treated by others, the
primary account of gender or racial equality here is structural. They describe a set of relationships among
assumptions and stereotypes, institutional policies, individual actions following rules or choosing in self-
interest, and collective consequences of these things, which constrain the options of some at the same time
as they expand the options of others. One could tell analogous stories of how the economic class position of
one's parents, neighborhoods and friends condition much of a person's life options because of the structural
inequalities of class." (Young 2001, p. 11)
The fact that these limitations on the life prospects of Native Americans are the
direct result of social institutions provide a strong argument to attempt to remedy these
injustices.
The advantage of focusing on social group well being or status is that it allows us
to better identify which groups are being systen1atically disadvantaged by the current
social structures. Young notes that there is a recursiveness to this method,
"When we criticize social conditions for being unjust, we do not choose random attributes of
individuals ...We construct the groups for comparison according to generally recognized social positions
which we already know have broad implications for how people relate to one another-class, race,
ethnicity, age, gender, occupation, ability, region, caste, citizenship status, and so on. The process of
evaluating group inequality for the sake of making judgments about injustice begins with the hypothesis
that comparing the average status of members of some of these groups will reveal patterns of inequality. By
a pattern, I mean the mapping of the distribution of some good across all social positions at a particular
time." (Young 2001, p. 15)
On this model, the discovery of one such pattern of inequality does not
necessarily indicate an injustice has occurred. One must investigate and find that such a
pattern is systemic 'by finding a pattern of average difference in level of status or well-
being along several parameters'. (Young 2001, p. 16) When we find that Native
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Americans as a group have the highest rates of infant mortality, teen suicide, death from
malnutrition, exposure and plague, and consistently experience the highest rate of
unemployment, lowest level of educational attainment, and one of the high rates of
incarceration among any group, and that this situation has persisted over generations,
coupled with the fact that we can tell a 'plausible structural story' to use Young's phrase,
that accounts for the production of the patterns of inequality, then we can generate a
strong argument that the structural organization of the society is responsible for the
creation of those inequalities and is therefore unjust as it inhibits the members of these
groups from exercising their liberties. 16
The advantage of adopting such an approach is that it avoids many of the
criticisms that traditionally plague group rights talk. Nothing in the argument about
assessing inequality in terms of structures denies the fact that groups are composed of
individuals, who must be seen as the final target of any policy changes and improvements
that result. Nor does this approach adopt a corporate conception of rights, through which
the group is given an independent status from those who compose its membership.
Instead, this conception notices the very real ways in which people and institutions treat
both themselves and others as group members when pursuing goals and policies. By
comparing groups along socially relevant categories and then seeing if those groups'
positions in the larger structures of society are in some way responsible for their
condition, be it significantly advantageous or disadvantageous, one is better able to show
how the opportunities and inhibitions related to their position in society denies the liberal
promise of equality.
16 See 'Can we tell a plausible structural story' which starts on p. 67 for more evidence on this point.
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Another advantage of this approach is that it avoids, as Young observes, "Th.e
worry that group-conscious measures of inequality suppress individual variation within
groups ... " (Young 2001, p. 17) It avoids this argument by virtue of the fact that it does
not seek to equalize the conditions of the groups as such, but rather considers the relative
status of each member from within that group. It seeks to promote a strong vision of
individual equality of opportunity rather than some static average state of affairs between
groups. In those cases where the structural inequalities between groups have been shown
to be unjust, through showing how they tend to systematically disadvantage certain
groups within society, then group rights packages can be targeted at those groups in order
to rectify the unfair advantage that other members of the society possesses, and that the
group does not.
Through adopting this conception of the proper working of liberal theory, one is
able to perceive the dissolution of the difficulties involved in offering group rights within
a liberal context. The group rights that are granted are not special benefits that provide
advantages to the targeted members that give them an unfair advantage over the rest of
society. Rather, they serve as a remedial function through which the inequalities that are
generated and perpetuated through social structures can become largely neutralized, in
pursuance with liberal ideals. In the event that these social structures are rearranged to
better accommodate oppressed groups, this theory would allow for the dissolution of
those specific liberal policies that were enacted to achieve equality that are no longer
necessary.
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CAN WE TELL A 'PLAUSIBLE STRUCTURAL STORY'?
In order for the argument just described to have force, we must look into the past and
present policies that explain how the structural relationships within society can be found
to be responsible for the creation of unjust inequalities that hinder individuals and groups
from exercising their liberties. In addition to the arguments presented in the earlier
portions of this work, I offer the following historical argument showing how the
structural arrangements in the United States unjustly hindered Native Americans.
The current legal status of the Native American nations in United States law is
that of a 'domestic dependent'. This status was originally invoked by Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court John Marshall, the originator of the Marshall Doctrine, to describe the
legal status of the Cherokee Nation in the early 1830's. Churchill explains that Marshall
argued "that the native nations of North America are "nations "like any other" in the sense
that they possessed both territories they were capable of ceding and recognizable
governmental bodies empowered to cede these areas through treaties... [However] they
were nations of a "peculiar type" both "domestic to" and "depelldent upon" the United
States, and therefore possessed of a degree of sovereignty intrinsically less than that
enjoyed by the United States itself." (Churchill 2000, p. 407) It should be noted that at
this time (1830) the Cherokee Nation's lands in question were completely surrounded by
the territoriality of the United States and may have born 'some relationship to the then-
prevailing reality, it must be reiterated that he did not confine his observations of the
situation to Cherokees', and went on to apply this doctrine to all subsequent Native
nations. (Churchill 2000, p. 407) The effect of this doctrine, which was not only applied
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to the Cherokee, but to all Native American nations including those not yet encountered
in any significant fashion at this time, was to limit the autonomy of Native American
nations by placing them under the control of the federal government rather than as fully
autonomous nations in their own right. This stood in clear violation of the original terms
under which Native American nations and the United States had agreed to operate under
and has been since characterized as providing a legal screen under which the United
States could attempt to fulfill its territorial ambitions. 17 Justice Marshall's interpretation
began a long relationship between the United States and Native Nations that became
increasingly paternal as the United States solidified its hold over Native America.
Further complications arose in 1885 when Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller
" ... rendered an opinion that consolidated and extended Marshall's earlier assertion of
federal plenary power over native nations, contending that the government held an
"incontrovertible right" to exercise authority over Indians as it saw fit and "for their OWll
good." Miller also concluded that Indians lacked any legal recourse in matters of federal
interest, their sovereignty being defined as whatever Congress did not remove through
specific legislation. This decision opened the door to enactment of more than 5,000
statutes regulating affairs in Indian Country through the present day." (Churchill 2000,
p409) In the 1903 decision Lonewolfv. Hitchcock, Justice Edward White effectively
eliminated the last vestiges oftme Native autonomy by extending "the concept of federal
plenary power to hold that the government possessed a right to unilaterally abrogate
whatever portion of any treaty with Indians it found inconvenient while continuing to
consider the remaining terms and provisions binding upon the Indians ... White also
17 For more on this idea, see Ward Churchill s Strugglefor the Land. Common Courage Press. 1993.
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opined that the government's plenary power over Indians lent it a "trust responsibility"
over residual native property such that it might opt to "change the form" of this
property-from land, say, to cash or "services"-whenever and however it chose to do
so." (Churchill 2000, p. 410)
That Justice Miller used the phrase 'for their own good' is especially telling of the
paternalistic mentality that has characterized the United States' discourse with Native
America throughout much of their relationship. The notion that Native Americans are
somehow incapable of managing their own affairs can be seen to be partially derived
from stereotypes that characterize Native Americans as child-like, simple, primitive, or in
some way inferior, and has distorted the discourse between the Native Nations and the
United States since the United States rose to military ascendancy. Of course the idea that
Native cultures are or were inferior is patently absurd as Michael Dorris claims in the
following passage.
"Among the several hundred separate cultures of North America alone, comprising as they did between
twelve and twenty million people in 1491, there existed a pluralism of social experimentation and
worldview unimagined by melting pot theorists. Every known form of political system was practiced, from
democracy to theocracy to communism to hereditary leadership. In the vast majority of these societies,
power and decision-making rested with both women and men. Most Native peoples were village-based
agriculturalists, not "roaming hunters." A wide variety of sciences-astronomy, agronomy, medicine,
mathematics, geology, meteorology, and taxonomy, to name only a few-were highly developed and
practiced. A wealth of spiritual and philosophical beliefs flourished. A tolerance for individual difference,
either within one's own culture or in another society altogether, was the norm. And yet this treasure trove
of experience and intelligence, perfected over tens of thousands of years residence on this continent, is
allowed to be eclipsed by dumb, racist drivel." (Dorris 1999, p. vii-viii)
Nevertheless, the United States continues a policy of abusive paternalism under
which the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) must approve all decisions made by Native
Nations before t11ey becom.e binding. Not only is this damaging to Native autonomy, it
has also opened the door for Native American wealth to be exploited.
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Following the Reorganization Act of 1934, the Native tribes were forced to ---
reorganize their tradition governments, which had already been stripped of their legal
standing though previous legislation, into an alien fonn of government based on U.S.
practice-an elected 'tribal chairman' and elected 'tribal council', which would after this
point be considered the legitimate governing bodies ofNative Americans. This move can
be seen as a clear manifestation of the United States' abusively paternalistic attitude
concerning Native Americans. The failure to recognize that traditional forms of Native
government had functioned well, and represented those cultures considered opinion upon
the best way to organize their social experience, has served to undermine the identity of
Native American cultures and serves as a significant obstacle in the development of
authentic Native personalities. The BIA maintains trusteeship of Native lands and
exercises total veto power over any decisions that the chairperson or councils make,
increasing the feelings of powerlessness and alienation experienced by Native
Americans. This situation has continued into the present despite the knowledge that the
BIA is often corrupt and inefficient, as noted in the following quotation.
"The Bureau of Indian Affairs has a history of Congressional politicking, mismanagement, internal
corruption, and general non-responsiveness to Native People's concerns. Numerous Congressional studies
over the years have condemned the BIA for inefficiency and outright cruelty." (Council on Interracial
Books for Children 1999, p. 89)
Given the supremacy of the BIA. over Native affairs, they must be held to some
degree of accountability for the dismal conditions that persist on Native lands. Some of
the more alanning warning signs of the abusively paternal relationship here exhibited can
be brought out by the following statement.
72
"While the Native American population has risen since the tum of the century it was-and still is-rising
much more slowly than the population as a whole. ative Americans have a life expectancy of 64 years
compared to 71 for whites. Twice as many ative American infants die during their rust year as do infants
as a whole. Tative Americans suffer the highest incidence of suicide TB, and alcoholism of any group in
the U.S. And an estimated 25-35 percent of all ative children are removed from their families and placed
in foster or adoptive homes or institutions. These figure are symptoms of the oppressive conditions under
which ative Americans exist." (Council on IntelTacial Books for Children 1999, p. 106)
Churchill notes that "It is presently estimated that as much as two-thirds of all
known U.S. "domestic" uranium reserves lies beneath reservation lands, as well as
perhaps a quarter of the readily accessible low-sulphur coal and about a fifth of the oil
and natural gas. In addition, the reservations are known to hold substantial deposits of
copper, zinc, iron, nickel, molybdenum, bauxite, zeolites, and gold." (Churchill 2000, p.
411) Given the fact that reservations occupy some of the most mineral wealthy lands in
the United States one would expect its residents to be among the most wealthy of all
aggregate groups, especially when combined with the fact that the 1980 U.S. Census
shows that Native peoples, as an aggregate group, "are the largest landholders on a per
capita basis of any population sector on the continent." (Churchill 2000, p. 412) Yet
despite these advantages, Native Americans 'suffer all the standard indices of dire
poverty' including 'the highest rates of infant mortality and teen suicide and of death
from malnutrition, exposure and plague.' Native Americans 'consistently experience the
highest rate of unemployment, lowest level of educational attainment, and one of the high
rates of incarceration among any group.' (Churchill 2000, p. 42)
Simply put, under the administration of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Native
interests have been allowed to suffer in favor of furthering the United States' national
interests. Specifically, the BIA has been responsible for allowing the exploitation of
Native lands by private and governmental organizations, who have reaped high profit
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margins while simultaneously giving very low returns for Native peoples. This has led
Native Americans to suffer the depredations ofpoverty caused and continued by their
forced assimilation into the United States, while at the same time suffering untold
damage to the development of authentic personalities by increasing feelings of
inadequacy, inferiority, degradation, powerlessness, and forcing them to live within the
cages of inauthentic identities.
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CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUD G ARGUMENTS
It seems prudent at this point to reexamine the two core principles of liberal
theory in light of the arguments made in this work. It was argued in the first chapter that
liberalism, in all of its fOnTIs, adheres to two fundamental principles that are traditionally
thought to be necessary for the functioning of liberal theory. The first of these claims,
rational revisability, has suffered little alteration in this work. The moral necessity of an
individual to be able to revise their OW11 moral ends in an uncoerced fashion with regards
to their conception of the good remains unchallenged. In keeping with this commitment,
liberalism would not have a!1 interest in promoting group rights that restrict this ability
unduly, and therefore would not allow protections for what Will Kymlicka terms 'internal
restrictions'. Internal restrictions are those that involve 'the claim of a group against its
own members'. These sorts of restrictions are usually intended to protect the group
against internal dissent, such as 'the decision of individual members not to follow
traditional practices or customs'. (Kymlicka 1995, p. 34) By not allowing undue internal
restrictions, liberalism can avoid one of the great entanglements of group rights theory,
expressly the granting of internal restrictive powers that involve intra-group relations to
national groups that may seek the use of such powers to restrict the liberty of its members
in the name of group solidarity. By refusing to grant such powers to groups, liberal theory
is able to remain steadfast in its opposition to individual oppression. For example,
liberalism would have no interest in granting intra-group restrictive powers/protections
such as the abilityto use state powers to enforce religious orthodoxy or oppressive
patriarchal/matriarchal policies. However some intra-group restrictions may be granted,
75
such as the ability to tax in support of public goods, perform some amount of military or
community service, required voting, etc. These policies would he defended on the
grounds that all governments require some level of minimal civic participation in order to
uphold liberal rights and institutions.
In contrast, liberalism should take an active interest in promoting those group
rights that are aimed at providing what Kymlicka refers to as 'external protections'.
External protections involve 'the claim of a group against the larger society' aimed at
protecting the group against the impact of external decisions, such as 'the economic or
political decisions of the larger society'. (Kymlicka 1995, p. 35) At their heart, external
protections seek to protect national groups distinct existence and identity by mitigating or
removing the impact of damaging decisions made by the dominant nation
By dividing protections into internal and external categories, liberalism is enabled
to promote the principle of rational revisability, while at the same time remaining
sensitive to the needs of national minorities. By not allowing internal restrictions, one
ensures the 'various national minority groups who might wish to invoke the coercive
powers of the state to enforce oppressive practices would be unable to do so, thereby
preserving the individuals' ability to freely determine their own conception of the good.
It is the second fundamental principle of liberalism, namely the neutrality of the
state, which I have argued requires a more nuanced interpretation than individual-
centered liberalism has traditionally offered. Liberal theorists must recognize that the
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neutrality of the state while a good idea in principle, masks bias in favor of the dominant
majority nation manifested through nation building policies. The specific fonns which
institutions take, such as public education, the geographical dispersals of governmental
offices, the language promoted, the drawing of voting districts, etc., all necessarily
privilege certain groups while disadvantaging others. In addition, this sort of problem
simply cannot be addressed by either a more rigorous application of traditional
liberalism, nor can additional difference blind policies correct these problems.
In chapter four, I argued that difference blind policies tend to favor the interests of
the dominant majority natiol1 while ignoring or devaluing interests that are beneficial to
the human condition, including values such as recognition, cultural membership, identity,
language rights, and other participatory goods in the case of national minorities. To
compound matters, it iS11't simply the case that potential benefits to the human condition
are remaining undeveloped, but instead that individualistic-centered liberalislll actually
cause significant harms to national minorities within multinational states. In chapter five I
argued that by ignoring these issues, liberalism perpetuates in the undennining of
national minority cultures through the erosion of their sense of identity, cultural
membership, and dignity; all of which are values that need to be protected in order to
ensure that an individual is able to freely choose amongst competing conceptions of the
good. By undermining these values, liberalism reduces the ability of the individual to
choose freely among conceptions of the good by making some of the alternatives subject
to socially created and, in many cases officially sanctioned stigmas and other structural
barriers that unfairly disadvantage certain groups. As was shown in chapters five and six,
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this can subvert attempts to construct authentic personalities by causing feelings of
oppression, inadequacy, and helplessness, all of which damage individuals ability to
remain and develop meaningful autonomy from within national minority cultures, which
are egregious harms. By protecting the dominant majority through nation building
practices, while at the same time denying similar nation building powers to other national
minorities, liberalism finds itself unable to adhere to both the principle of neutrality and
rational revisability.
Worse yet, by not acknowledging and correcting the unjust structural inequalities
that exist as a necessary product of any social organization, specifically inequalities that
affect certain groups within a society, any form of liberalism that only considers
individual rights will find itself unable to craft policies that can effectively counter-act
these unjust inequalities, as was argued in chapter six.
In order to correct for this bias group rights are necessary within liberalism, to
remove the socially created disadvantages that are attendant upon national minorities, but
not upon the rest of the dominant nation. So rather than viewing group rights as offering
'special' or 'extra' rights, as much of liberal theory has traditionally argued, group rights
actually represent a leveling of the playing field by removing the unequal distribution of
benefits and burdens that difference blind policies perpetuate in multinational states.
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So, in effect, the state ensures that its distribution of the burdens upon national
groups remains equal by creating group rights policies designed to counter the unjust
inequalities caused by the structural realities within the society. This is defended in tenns
ofpromoting the individuals ability to freely choose and serves as a realization of this
ability. By protecting groups from becoming overburdened and engulfed by the dominant
majority culture, liberalism is able to come closer to protecting the individual rights of
the members within those groups, and brings itself closer to liberalism's goals of
promoting freedom and equality between individuals.
DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN UTILIZING LIBERALISM TO RESOLVE
ALL OF THE CLAIMS MADE BY NATIONAL MINORITIES
However, Young's model does not flawlessly mesh with some of the most basic
claims made by many national minorities. Young's argument might rectify nlany of the
injustices that currently plague liberalism, and may serve as a workable model for ethnic
alld gender based claims for equality within a nation state. The flexibility and
temporality of her method would allow for a significant improvement in the status of
Native Americans and other national minorities that exist within multination states.
Further, by adopting such a-plan, liberal governments should become able to better
recognize the structural factors that preclude the reality of the principles of neutrality and
equality. But it fails to identify with OD.e of the most fundamental claims made by many
national minorities, namely that they are morally entitled to their own state. In most
cases-and certainly in the case of Native Americans-national minorities possessed
their own fully functioning nations prior to European invasion. Accepting 'mere'
citizenship within the national majority, even if it is on better terms, still ignores their
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basic claim: that they are a different nation that deserves to be in control of its own
destiny. Native objections to accepting simple citizenship have remained a common
theme throughout their history, and that feeling can be brought out in the following quote.
"The term Native American, in and of itself, is a seemingly harmless term, but it is used in a way that
infers, however innocent its author, that native people are somehow exactly the same as other hyphenated
Americans (Chinese-Americans, Polish-Americans, etc.). That would not be objectionable, except that
native peoples are in fact members of their respective nations, and the denial of their rights as distinct and
separate nations with their own territories, sovereignty, cultures, and power over their own lives has been
the basis of much racialist policy in the Western Hemisphere." (Akwesasne Notes 1977)
So, while Young's model does seem to improve the prospects of national
minorities and others who choose to operate wit11il1 a liberal nation state, it may not go far
enough in recognizing the independent status of some of those groups. Indigenous
peoples around the world have consistently argued for, and in a few cases won,
recognition of their rights to self-detennination. But in the vast majority of cases
indigenous peoples have been denied such rights and found themselves instead facing
widespread discrimination and n1arginalization at the hands of the local majority culture
National minorities are ill many ways, uniquely suitable candidates for secession.
As has been argued, indigenous groups, in nearly every instance of those groups
surviving, satisfy all of the c011ditions needed to define a nation. Namely, they were
institutionally complete, possessed distinct languages and cultures, and formed a
historical community occupyil1g a given territory or homeland. Indigenous peoples were
often large-scale, anonymous 18 groups that had a common culture and character that
encompassed many important aspects of life and which marks the character of the life of
18 By 'anonymous' I refer to the idea that they were not groups small enough to know all of the group
members individually, but must iv.stead rely on the possession of general characteristics for mutual
recognition.
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its members, where membership in those groups was a matter of mutual recognition and
was important for one's self-identification and was a matter of belonging and not
achievement. 19 The possession of these characteristics makes them suitable candidates for
the possession of group rights, as was defined in chapter one. Similarly, the possession of
these characteristics would seem to confer upon them the same level of legitimacy,
whatever that may be, that any nation state possesses.
The right to secede and the conditions under which such a right might obtain,
represents a huge and rapidly growing field of inquiry. While it is not the purpose of this
paper to decide which theory of secession provides the ideal model, I will argue that
under most conceptions of secession that indigenous peoples should qualify for both the
attainme11t of and as possessing a right to secede.
Nonnative theories of secession can be broadly characterized as falling between
two poles; the first recognizing the right to secede as a remedial right20, the second
recognizing the right to secede as a primary right. Typically, those theorists who defend
secession as a primary right argue that the legitimacy of the state is derived from those
peoples whom it would govern through their direct consent. In the case where a group or
region \vishes to no longer be governed by the state in which it exists, and where this
interest is clearly advocated, then secession is a legitimate option even in the absence of
any harms. This position is usually defended by arguing that an individual or group
19 These criteria were developed by Margalit & Raz in 'National Self-Determination' The Journal of
Philosophy, v.87, n.9 September, 1990. p.439-461.
20 For an example of a remedial rights theory see Allen Buchanan's 'Theories of Secession' Philosophy and
Public Affairs, v. 26, n. 1, p3 1-61. For an example of a primary rights theory see Avishai Margalit &
Joseph Raz's 'National Self-Determination'. Journal of Philosophy, v. 87, n. 9. Sept. 1990 p. 439-461.
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should have control over those decisions that closely affect their lives. As the type of
government that one lives under dramatically impacts the life prospects of a group, that
group should be granted the ability to choose their own form of association in order to
best exercise their autonomy and to better represent their vision of the good. Different
primary right theorists will place different conditions governing the conditions that must
be met in the absence of any injustice, but they argue that secession is a right
fundamental to human societies. As this type of theory is more expansive in its view than
a remedial right only theory of secession concerning the conditions for secession, it
seems highly unlikely that one could generate a right to secede under a remedial rights
theory of secession that could not also be generated under a primary rights theory of
secession. Given this probability, I will examine the conditions for secession under
remedial rights only theories, and argue why national minorities should be granted the
right to secede. If it is successfully argued that a group should be granted a right to
succeed under the remedial right of secession theory, then this will also serve to establish
why it should be granted a right to succeed in addition to any other conditions it may
meet for a right to secede under a primary right to secession theory.
Remedial rights theorists offer a more exclusive vision concerning the rights of
secession and the conditions under which it obtains. Allen Buchanan explains that
remedial right only theorists typically argue that " .. the (general) right to secede is in
important respects similar to the right to revolution, as the latter is understood by what
may be called the n1ainstream of normative theories of revolution. The latter are typified
by John Locke's theory, according to which the people have the right to overthrow the
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government if and only if their fundamental rights are violated, and more peaceful means
have been to no avail [21]." (Buchanan 1997, p. 34) Buchanan claims that the primary
difference between the right to secede and the right to secession 'is that the right to
secede accrues to a portion of the citizenry, concentrated in a part of the territory of the
state' with 'the object of the exercise of the right to secede not to overthrow the
government, but only to sever the government's control over that portion of the territory'.
He continues,
"If the only effective remedy against selective tyranny is to oppose the government, then a strategy of
opposition that stops short of attempting to overthrow the government (revolution), but merely seeks to
remove one's group and the territory it occupies from the con!Tol of the state (secession), seems both
morally unexceptionable and, relatively moderate. For this reason, a Remedial Right Only approach to the
right to secede can be seen as a valuable compliment to the Lockean approach to the right to revolution
understood as a remedial right. In both the case of revolution and that of secession, the right is understood
as the right of persons subject to a political authority to defend themselves from serious injustices as a
remedy of last resort." (Buchanan 1997, p. 34)
To serve as an example of a remedial rights only theory of secession, I will
examine Buchanan's theory of secession, which will serve as a representative of a
ren1edial right only theory of secession. In Secession, Buchanan argues that a group has a
right to secede under two basic conditions. (Buchanan 1991) The first being that the
'physical survival of its members is threatened by actions of the state (as with the policy
of the Iraqi government towards the Kurds in Iraq) or it suffers violations of other basic
human rights (as with the East Pakistanis who seceded to create Bangladesh in 1970)'.
(Buchanan 1997, p. 35) The second condition under which a group has a right to secede
is when its 'previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken by the state (as with the
21 Bracketed footnote follows this papers footnote schema, not Buchanan's. Buchanan's footnote reads as
follows, "John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (Hackett Publishing Co., 1980), pp.l 00-124.
Strictly speaking, it may be incorrect to say that Locke affmns a right to revolution ifby revolution is
meant an attempt to overthrow the existing political authority. Locke's point is that if the government acts
in ways that are not within the scope of the authority granted to it by the people's consent, then
governmental ceases to exist. In tbat sense instead of a Lockean right to revolution it would be more
accurate to speak of the right of the people to constitute a new governmental authority.
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Baltic Republics)'. (p. 35) While it has been here argued that individual-centered
liberalism does in fact violate basic human rights through the unjust distribution of
burdens upon national minorities, the degree to which this argument has been successful
will affect the legitimacy of the application of the first condition. Given the possible
uncertainty of the first claim to the present day circumstance concerning national
minorities within the United States, I will focus my attention upon the second claim,
which seems to be much less disputable.
Throughout chapters three and five examples were given of the history of treaty
making between the United States and Native nations. These examples included the
original acknowledgment by the European powers of Native American sovereignty over
the lands which they inhabited and controlled. The United States upon its [onnation
actively purs·ued relations with and acknowledged these nations sovereignty. However,
once the United States gained the military and political power to renege upon those
treaties, it began a systematic policy tIlat involved the physical relocation of Native
nations coupled with genocidal and social programs designed to remove North American
native nations from the face of the earth. It should be noted that the United States'
activities from 1835-1894 stand in clear violation of the United Nations declaration made
by the General Assembly concerning genocide enforced in 1951. (United Nations 1951)
The declaration defines genocide as
"..any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (D) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." (p. 62)
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destruction) or simply ignored when it became feasible to do so. These factors seem to
-.
preclude any hope of obtaining a strong moral claim to those lands now occupied by
European Americans. Further the legitimacy of the United States claims of governing
powers over those nations assimilated without having given their consent to be so
governed seems to be invalidated by both the historical guarantees that the United States
offered Native American under conditions of fair negotiations and then reneged upon and
by the subsequent abuses that the Native nations suffered at the hands of the United
States.
Given these injustices, it seems that under either conception of secession;
secession viewed as a remedial right or a secession as a remedial right, that national
minorities within the United States should be recognized as having a moral claim to
secede. To the degree that this paper has been successful in establishing the harms
inflicted by dominant national majorities upon national minorities constitutes a physical
threat to the survival of Native nations constitutes a violation of basic human rights, then
the right to secession under the first criteria that theories of secession acknowledge (the
physical survival of its members is threatened by actions of the state or it suffers
violations of other basic human rights) has been met. To the degree that the Native
nations and other national minorities possessed previously sovereign territories that were




It is my opinion that if the national minorities rights are adequately respected-
within the states that they occupy, options short of secession may prove to be an
acceptable alternative. In fact, from past to present, Native Americans have remained
sensitive to their interconnectedness with European settlers. For example, in the 1988
session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission's Working Group on
Indigenous Populations in Geneva, Switzerland, an Iroquois diplomat made a special
presentation to the Working Group of the Gus- Wen- Tah, the Two Row Wampum belt.22
The Gus- Wen- Tah treaty belt was presented centuries ago by the Iroquois to the Western
colonizing nations that first came to North America. Robert Williams describes the belt
as
" ... comprised of a bed of white wampum shell beads symbolizing the sacredness and purity of the treaty
agreement between the two sides. Two parallel rows of purple wampum beads that extend down the length
of the belt represent the separate paths traveled by the two sides on the same river. Each side travels in its
own vessel: the Indians in a birch bark canoe, representing their laws, customs, and ways, and the whites in
a ship, representing their laws, customs, and ways. In presenting the Gus- Wen- Tah to solemnize their
treaties with the Western colonial powers, the Iroquois would explain its basic underlying vision of law and
peace between different peoples as follows: "We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in our
own boat. either of us will steer the others vessel." (Williams 1997 p. 4)23
By presenting this belt, the Iroquois were renewing a centuries old indigenous
North i\merican legal tradition that asserts the ongoing significance of tribal traditions in
the contemporary rights movement. As alluded to by the metaphor of the boats on the
river, the Iroquois recognized that Native Nations and European colonies may need to
share the same environs, but that this process need not exclude the other or result in the
subordination of any culture. If one examines the language of North American
indigenous diplomacy of the Encounter Era period (1600-1800), one can see the
22 See 'Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Sixth Session' U. . ESCOR C .4,
U. . Doc. E/C .4/sub.2/1988/24, at 7 (1988)
23 See Indian Self-Government in Canada, Report o/the Special Committee. 1983
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constitutional principles that Woodlands Indian groups believed governed their
relationships with European-Americans emphasizes the interconnectedness of the groups.
Williams continues,
~'It may seem odd to most Americans to speak of an Indian treaty negotiated during the colonial period of
our nation's history as a 'constitutional' text. In the traditional national mythology discussions of
constitutional texts normally revolve around the U.S. Constitution of 1787 ... If, however, we think of a
constitution-not in the traditional American sense of one basic, written document of law but rather as the
British use of the term-as encompassing a whole body of values, customary practices, and traditions basic
to the polity, we can begin to reconstIuct a much different set of indigenous constitutional principles
generated by American Indian treaty visions of lawand peace for the emerging multicultural society of
Encounter era eastern North America. For Indians of the Encounter era, treaties, as sacred texts, required
treaty partners to accept a common set of constitutional values reflecting their shared humanity under their
covenant. Treaties, as constitutionalized connections, gave rise to customary bonds that treaty partners
could rely on in tilnes of need or crisis. Treaties told as stories sought to sustain a constitutional tradition of
human solidarity between different peoples." (Willian1s 1997, p. 98-99)
Given this example of the willingness of some Native Americans to view the
relationship ofNative Americans and the United States as a collective venture, it is not
unreasonable to think that if Native Americans are granted sufficient powers of self-
determination over their own affairs, that they may not opt to advocate secession, even if
they have a legitimate right to secede.24 It SeelTIS that one of the driving forces behind
national minorities claims for nation status derives not so much from a desire to be
considered as an official nation as such, (although this does drive some movements) as
from a desire to avoid being oppressed and otherwise treated in unfair manners. Many
national minorities have a long history of oppression at the hands of dominant majority
nations and believe that official nation status may be their only hopes for protecting their
cultures, lands, and languages. If national minorities are given significant powers of self-
determination, such as language rights, control of education, and some form of
autonomous or semi-autonomous regions of control, combined with an approach adopted
24 I defme 'self-determination' in the following sense, as "to validate the rights of individual subgroups to
determine their own future irrespective of the needs of others (the majority) in the state in which they live"
(Peang-Meth, Abdulgaffar 2002, p.1 09)
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by the dominant national majority that is sympathetic to the special conditions for justice
that are necessary for national minorities operating in liberal systems, then they may feel
that they are being sufficiently recognized and empowered and may choose to voluntarily
remain within the polity. However in those cases where such recognition is not deemed
sufficient, and where national minorities can demonstrate either historical or current
injustices being perpetrated upon them by a state commensurate with the claims made
earlier then they filLst be recognized as possessing a moral right to secession.
But the question still ren1ains, 'What would the policies look like that would
reinforce a sense of dignity and recognition for national minorities that would provide
them ith reasonable po ers of self-determination?' While the ultimate ans er to this
question ould need to be de\ eloped through opening an honest and ongoing dialogue
ith national minorities that considers their indi\ idual wants and needs at least a few
go eming features seen1 likel to result fronl such a process. 2: Gi en the importance of
language policies and education that ha e alread been established concerning the
creation and 111aintenance of nations these areas seen1 like reasonable places to start.
Education nla pro ide the single 1110st useful tool and one of the easiest to appl
concenling issues of group [ights for national nlinorities. In the first case traditional
111ethods of education should be aUo ed for all men1bers rho so desire to pursue such an
25 As in man cases the actual kinds of ants and needs are going to ar depending on such factors as the
nlodern day size of the national nlinority ho\;v strongl it wishe to pursue its rights, the forms that these
policies mi ht take. and so on. It is an unfortunate fact that man of the national minorities 'ithin the S
probabl lack th nuninlunl population nece sar for the conlplere recreation and 111aintenance of their
culture 0 r tilne whate er the 111ean taken to protect thenl alight be. hat i to be tressed is that the
hould be intinlately in 01 ed in uch a process and aIlo ed~ to a significant degree~ the final stamp of
appro al on the polici that are enacted ith their benefit in mind to a oid the type of abusi e paternalism
that wa earli r I11entioned.
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option. Additionally, the materials used within the dominant national majority culture of
the United States will need to undergo revision in order to more accurately depict the
realities and historical achievements of national minority cultures. Changes would likely
include the addition of non-stereotypical sources ofinfonnation concerning national
minorities, the inclusion of important national minority figures to serve as role models,
lllaterials dealing with the current reality of national majorities, and a more nuanced
version of history that takes into account the interplay of ideas and values between
national minority cultures and the following waves of immigrants to the ew World.
The intended result of these policies would be to increase understanding concerning
present day national minorities and the accomplishments that they have made and
continue to nlake to the state. These policies would be aimed at increasing the national
majorities a areness of the issues concerning present day national minorities and
ac1al0w ledging their accomplisrunents in the past.
This would not only serve to aUo the national majority to gain a more accurate
understallding of the historical processes that actually occurred within the United States
and are still occurring but would also serve as the foundation for a new beginning in the
dialogue bet een the national nlajority alld its minority nations. By gaining a more
accurate understanding of the history and cultures of nlinorit cultures this would likel
reduce the misunderstandings that have characterized the relations between the groups.
This will also predispose the national majority to take the claims of national minorities
more seriously, hich ould engender ne conversations concerning the dispensation of
land rights appropriate go en1ll1ental forms and protections language policies
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educational techniques and policies, and so on. Further, monies could be set aside for the
creation of national minority schools that would be conducted in the language of those
students.
Additionally, programs could be established at both the primary, secondary, and
collegiate levels of education that emphasize the importance of bilingual education for
both national majority and minolity students. By providing incentives for the arious
sides to learn the others' language, the perpetuation of those languages could be
extended. Given the importance of language in perpetuating cultures, it would also seem
reasollable to allow national minorities to conduct both their private and public affairs in
their nati e language and to require all communication to be in those languages, in those
areas where they form the majority or have been designated. While in most cases this
ill probably be on reser ations at least in the case of ative Americans, it ill still
offer a sphere of protection for the language. Further this sphere of protection would not
be inferior to the prospects that many indigenous minorities might expect e en if they
seceded as their relati ely 10 populations in comparison to the United States conlbined
ith their geographical locations in the nlajority of cases would effecti ely ensure that
the ould ha e to use their 0 11 language and English in a bilingual fashion in order to
promote their own trade interests. go emmental negotiations and seeking employment
outside of tlleir nations. For those relations taking place within national minority
controlled areas, presumably the national minorities language ould be preferable for
transactions. By pro iding a sphere ofprotection for national millority languages- hich
exists already for the national majority, as has been argued-eombined ith incenti es to
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offer national minority languages through the various forms of public education, should
aid national minority languages to survive and flourish.
Finally, creative new conceptions of the governmental relation.s between national
n1inority groups will need to be conceived in order to better recognize the distinctive
claims that many national minorities have regarding self-government. In the specific
case of ative Americans it would seem reasonable to expect an examination of the
historical treaties between the ative American natio11s and the United States aimed at
identifying and rectifying past injustices. The changes in the educational system already
suggested ould 110pefully provide a ne basis for and an increasing willingness on the
part of the national majority to fairl -evaluate the clain1s and contentions of ative
Americans based on a ne notion of respect and equal dignity bet een peoples. Such an
e aluation 111ay include the need to use the international community such as the United
ations, to adjucate competing claims here no other options present themselves. One
potelltial ad antage to such adjucation \ auld be that it auld mitigate the particular
interests of both of the groups and pro ide a more impartial forum for judgment than is
currently pro ided.
Whate er the e entual indi idual solutions to the difficulties posed by the
presence of national nlinorities within the United States, the adoption of group rights
packages can b seen as a useful int mlediate step and perhaps as a pennanent solution
in resol ing those issues. By pro1110ting group rights one can be seen to be augmenting
the liberal traditions emphasis on equalit by ensuring that no groups ithin a society are
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subjected to oppressive practices that preclude the individual members of those groups
from being able to fully and fairly participate within liberal societies. Further, by
ensuring that 'double bind' and other oppressive situations do not occur that adversely
affect peoples ability to make free, uncoerced decisions, liberalism finds itself closer to
realizing its dream of fairness. By promoting group rights that address the injustices that
are perpetuated by the structural relationships within a society and cause unjust
inequalities to manifest between group rights, liberalism can ensure that the state is truly
remaining neutral by not pri ileging certain groups within its boundaries, thereby
fulfilling its responsibilities to equality and neutrality.
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